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Apply→Lending liquidations and protocol incidents from on-chain events and De.Fi reports.
On-chain liquidation events from Aave V3, Morpho, and Compound V3 on Ethereum, Base, and Arbitrum. USD values appear only when evidence exists.
50 shown
| When | Protocol | Collateral | Debt | USD | Tx |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
10h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 540,972 | 525 | Unknown | View↗ |
10h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 271,430 | 263,596,250 | Unknown | View↗ |
10h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 21,938 | 21,304,487 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 16,859 | 56.6136 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 9,872 | 33.1518 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 242,295,346 | 502,196 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 213,482,116 | 324,610 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 119,618,896 | 247,809,975,771 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 81,495,072 | 146,077,941,831 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 26,888,081,571 | 119,472 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 13.2166 | 27,155 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 881,797,741,469 | 1,812 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 1.0102 | 1,676 | Unknown | View↗ |
11h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 94,438 | 320.2018 | Unknown | View↗ |
12h ago Nov 20, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 760,453 | 2,590 | Unknown | View↗ |
13h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 10.6488 | 36,393 | Unknown | View↗ |
14h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 881 | 3.0429 | Unknown | View↗ |
15h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 2,927 | 4.5457 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 153.1938 | 87,912 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 84.2397 | 49,796 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 20.3264 | 12,015 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 13.335 | 7,890 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 1.4747 | 871.713 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 774,364 | 262,822,582,475 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 25,695 | 15.2047 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 9.6015 | 33,196 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Base | 5.8239 | 3,395 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Base | 2.8412 | 1,681 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 102.9114 | 61,222 | Unknown | View↗ |
16h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 10.5744 | 6,285 | Unknown | View↗ |
17h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 9.3067 | 5,540 | Unknown | View↗ |
17h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 2.1485 | 1,279 | Unknown | View↗ |
17h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 20.5486 | 12,232 | Unknown | View↗ |
17h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 2.1404 | 1,274 | Unknown | View↗ |
17h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 24.3787 | 14,512 | Unknown | View↗ |
17h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 12.2345 | 7,283 | Unknown | View↗ |
17h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 1.9196 | 1,142 | Unknown | View↗ |
21h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 24.9192 | 20,432 | Unknown | View↗ |
21h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 1.1053 | 925.2953 | Unknown | View↗ |
22h ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Base | 85,803 | 51.4087 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Arbitrum | 4.551 | 4.355 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 41.3713 | 40,824 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 94,635,301 | 92,285,363 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 482,920 | 1,702 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 198,611,033 | 341,345,525,525 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 68 | 250,502,611,812 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 116,833,679 | 183,128 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 97,914,467 | 168,473 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 19, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 75,633,639 | 161,218 | Unknown | View↗ |
1d ago Nov 18, 2026 | Aave V3 Ethereum | 888,456,760 | 1.5078 | Unknown | View↗ |
Exploit and incident reports from De.Fi. Yield.ly does not verify incident severity or completeness.
50 shown
Impact
Quick Summary On November 18, 2026, decentralized AI network Gonka AI suffered an exploit on its Ethereum cross-chain bridge (0x972a7A92D92796a98801A8818bcF91f1648f2F68), resulting in approximately $1.05M–$1.06M in total losses across roughly five transactions. Details of the Exploit Under Gonka AI's cross-chain architecture, redemptions and token issuances on Ethereum require cryptographic signatures verified against a rotating epoch BLS group key representing the network's validator set. The attacker (0x6650a1CB0c3B970a0e4CEd26984fe06DB7844D80) executed an unauthorized rotation of the bridge contract's epoch BLS group key, which simultaneously serves as the WGNK ERC-20 token contract, effectively hijacking the bridge's signature verification and authorization mechanism. Using self-signed authorizations under the rogue BLS key across roughly five transactions (including 0xa6b23e579b004e47657fd8f963a1f5732c5063a7d6eb7f9d7b185cd05d487178), the exploiter drained the bridge's remaining ~$884,800 in USDT and USDC liquidity reserves and minted approximately $172,000 in unbacked WGNK tokens without locking native GNK in escrow on the Gonka chain. The stolen assets and newly minted tokens were subsequently routed through Uniswap and dispersed across multiple wallets to complicate recovery efforts. Block Data Reference Vulnerable Bridge / Token Contract: 0x972a7A92D92796a98801A8818bcF91f1648f2F68 (Gonka Bridge / WGNK) Primary Attacker Address: 0x6650a1CB0c3B970a0e4CEd26984fe06DB7844D80 Example Exploit Transaction: 0xa6b23e579b004e47657fd8f963a1f5732c5063a7d6eb7f9d7b185cd05d487178
Impact
Quick Summary On November 18, 2026, K3 Capital’s sBOLD yield vault on Ethereum Mainnet (an ERC-4626 wrapper built over Liquity V2 Stability Pools) was completely drained of its ~$3.42M–$3.43M TVL across 97 transactions. Triggered by a swap-validation and share-pricing accounting mismatch, the initial attacker and a competitive wave of MEV copycat bots extracted the vault's BOLD liquidity, with ~59% of the stolen value captured by Ethereum block builders (in MEV bribes) and one copycat bot, while the initial attacker bridged ~$520K (~291 ETH) to Bitcoin via THORChain and Maya Protocol. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability stemmed from an accounting and swap-verification flaw in the sBOLD vault (0x50Bd66D59911F5e086Ec87aE43C811e0D059DD11), which checked how much BOLD a collateral swap returned without verifying that the router actually spent the same token and amount used to calculate the output requirement, while also ignoring unswapped collateral balances below a set threshold when pricing vault shares. The initial attacker (0xDC0e2FDEb89D2F363F2EA1B50E923d464C414dAA) used flash-loaned wstETH and a helper contract (0x19Ad153B83f9a1cbCAc2182DcEf14D0E825A9634) to leave uncounted WETH in the vault, mint sBOLD shares at an artificially depressed valuation, trigger a swap so the vault's share price jumped to include the newly converted BOLD, redeem existing depositors' BOLD at the inflated rate, and recover their temporary WETH via a second swap priced against 1 wei of wstETH using a lingering WETH approval. Within minutes, MEV searchers and copycat bots replicated the exploit across 97 transactions over eight minutes, with a single copycat bot extracting $1.91M (56%) and paying $1.78M in bribes to Ethereum block builders, before K3 Capital paused the contracts at 13:08 UTC, while the initial attacker swapped ~291 ETH (~$520K) into ~8.07 BTC across eight Bitcoin addresses via THORChain and Maya Protocol. Block Data Reference Vulnerable Vault Contract: 0x50Bd66D59911F
Impact
Quick Summary On November 16, 2026, decentralized perpetual futures exchange Lighter suffered an incident resulting in ~$15.48M in compromised market-maker funds across two accounts, of which $10,393,057 USDC was withdrawn off-platform while ~$5.09M USDC was intercepted and recovered before exiting. Details of the Exploit The root cause was cryptographic nonce reuse in external trader signing code, which enabled the attacker to mathematically reconstruct API private keys from publicly visible signatures for two large market-maker accounts (#714710 and #714723). Because Lighter permitted API keys to manage positions and transfer funds between accounts or pools tied to the same underlying address without requiring a fresh Layer 1 wallet signature, the attacker closed the victims' open trading positions, created a 0%-fee public liquidity pool under a compromised account, deposited ~$10,000 to claim 99.99% of pool shares, and funneled the victims' USDC into the pool in ~$1M increments before redeeming the shares. At 10:11 UTC, the attacker withdrew 10,393,057 USDC from Lighter's Ethereum settlement contract to wallet 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387, swapping the funds into ~5,752–5,764 ETH via CoW Swap within minutes and routing 160 ETH batches through Relay and LI.FI across multiple wallets to Hyperliquid to purchase XMR1. Lighter swiftly paused withdrawals and pool creation, activated Guardian mode, and executed a Security Council contract upgrade—successfully intercepting and returning the second ~$5.09M USDC tranche to the affected trader before resuming operations later the same day with mandatory wallet-signature requirements on transfers. Block Data Reference Primary Attacker Address (Ethereum): 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387
Impact
Quick Summary On November 14, 2026, the Kava blockchain's native lending protocol, Kava Lend, suffered a major exploit resulting in the drain of approximately 55.2 million KAVA tokens (worth ~$3.76M pre-attack). The exploit caused the price of KAVA to plunge by nearly 40% to 50%. Details of the Exploit The attack targeted Kava Lend’s dormant BUSD stablecoin market, where the protocol’s interest rate calculation guarded against a net supply of exactly zero but failed to protect against near-zero figures. By repaying existing open loans and calibrating deposits and withdrawals to leave the pool's net supply at just 2 base units, the attacker caused the BUSD supply index to multiply roughly 243,000-fold within three minutes, artificially inflating their BUSD deposit claim to over 1.25 billion BUSD on paper. Using a secondary helper wallet, the attacker repeatedly deposited BUSD as collateral, withdrew the real tokens via the inflated claim, borrowed KAVA against the phantom collateral, and self-liquidated the helper one block later, forcing the empty pool to wipe out the debt while leaving the helper with the borrowed tokens across 127 rounds over 98 minutes, draining the KAVA pool from 55.33 million down to 0.19 tokens. Six hours later, the attacker bridged ~49.2 million KAVA to BNB Chain via LayerZero and sold 48.4 million KAVA within 35 minutes through aggregators including MetaMask Swaps and CoW Protocol for ~$2.09 million in BNB and USDT, subsequently routing proceeds into XMR1 on Hyperliquid and cross-chain bridges like LI.FI and Chainflip. Relay bridge intercepted and froze $612,416 USDT (29% of the sale proceeds) under a BLOCKED_WALLET flag, while Kava paused the Axelar bridge as a precaution and major exchanges including Upbit, Bithumb, and Coinone halted KAVA deposits and withdrawals.
Impact
Quick Summary On November 12, 2026, tokenized equity lending protocol Edel Finance disclosed that approximately $300,000 worth of its native $EDEL tokens were stolen and subsequently sold across the open market. Details of the Exploit The incident involved the unauthorized extraction and rapid market liquidation of ~$300,000 in $EDEL tokens, which drove immediate downward sell pressure on the token (trading near ~$0.0123 following a broader weekly decline from ~$0.0180). While the exact root cause and attack vector (such as smart contract logic vs. treasury/operational wallet compromise) have not yet been publicly specified, the attack occurred one day after Softstack published a penetration test covering Edel Finance's perpetual futures backend infrastructure and four months after the protocol suffered a separate ~$403,000 flash-loan oracle manipulation exploit on July 1, 2026. Emergency containment measures with centralized exchanges successfully froze a portion of the stolen tokens during the off-ramp attempt, with formal post-mortem details awaiting verification by the team.
Impact
Quick Summary On November 9, 2026, decentralized finance protocol Arcus suffered a security breach resulting in the theft of approximately $2.23 million in USDG tokens. The attacker rapidly laundered and bridged all stolen funds out via Relay Protocol within 50 minutes, distributing the proceeds across Ethereum and Bitcoin. Details of the Exploit The attacker successfully drained approximately $2.23M in USDG from Arcus and immediately initiated a multi-chain laundering cascade using Relay Protocol. Within 50 minutes of the exploit, the USDG was bridged over to Ethereum and swapped into roughly 475 ETH and ~$1.01 million in DAI. Simultaneously, ~$208,000 of the proceeds were routed across to Bitcoin utilizing THORChain and Relay. On-chain intelligence has mapped out the primary holding addresses where the bulk of the unrecovered proceeds currently sit. Block Data Reference Primary Attacker / Holding Addresses: 0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd (Ethereum) 0x9a30f6a596f3354ecb90d6bd3a2a16750dcf13d0 (Ethereum) bc1qtlme3nlwhlrcdjw5xv8g83t8fakw6snze79wn7 (Bitcoin)
Impact
Quick Summary In November 9th 2026, cross-chain infrastructure provider Ankr suffered a security breach resulting in approximately $304,500 in losses. The attack exploited a receipt-validation flaw where the bridge processed forged cross-chain withdrawal receipts bearing valid signatures from a trusted consensus signer without independently checking them against actual source-chain events. Details of the Exploit The attacker submitted five separate fraudulent cross-chain withdrawal transactions referencing a single legitimate Optimism transaction (0x02e805b5...). By altering the recipient address, token type, and withdrawal amounts while keeping valid signatures from the bridge's consensus key mechanism, the attacker bypassed verification logic in the vulnerable target contract (0xc437DF90...). This allowed the withdraw() function to release assets to the attacker's designated recipient address (0x119D250b...) multiple times using the same reused source context. SlowMist’s investigation noted that while the receipts carried genuine consensus signatures, the exact origin of those signatures remained under active review, with signer key compromise still unconfirmed at the time of reporting. Block Data Reference Attacker / Tx Sender Address: 0x9A88Dd45AE846A979705c9cFdfD0f229e592D703 Beneficiary Recipient Address: 0x119D250b82C1cf5345dF5912EFb4B1a4107a1Aa6 Vulnerable Bridge Contract: 0xc437DF90B37C1dB6657339E31BfE54627f0e7181 Exploit Transaction Hashes: 0x7310af5d53e08259915bc3547daf343d188b9c36db8dd6b3ff3b5e70565e88df 0x90c563360cc343a640721662abe762e9ab9665aee0c22820b1656ff23bcfc891 0xde2d5b455c0071698fec9c23a9c50f9ecdfd8efa96b4fbb48ed0620bd4c29b5c 0x91ba1a9c81a1bb67ce7a2779d5b2de54b7aece166f67d9e3a31e29e4e13c2886 0x46e20d4c8cd43dece94f7a2a890a348fefcb0dc8310279658c8f836e758bdad0
Impact
Quick Summary On November 9, 2026 marking Initia's second major security incident within a month, an attacker breached Initia’s cloud and rollup hosting infrastructure via a command injection exploit using a compromised Google Cloud Platform (GCP) key. By pivoting from exposed environment variables to GitHub, GCP, and Anvil (Initia's rollup hosting platform), the attacker validated forged Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) withdrawals across five rollups, unlocking ~$3.27M from Initia L1’s IBC escrow accounts. Emergency network halts trapped $2.16M of the stolen funds on the paused L1, limiting net bridged-out losses to ~$1.11M before outbound IBC rate limits halted further exits. Details of the Exploit The attack originated when the intruder exploited a command injection vulnerability using a compromised GCP key designated for provisioning private nodes, exposing sensitive environment variables. Leveraging those exposed secrets, the attacker accessed Initia’s GitHub and GCP environments to harvest additional credentials, ultimately compromising Anvil, the hosting platform managing Initia's interconnected rollups. With privileged access to Anvil, the attacker forged and validated fraudulent IBC withdrawal proofs across five rollups, successfully unlocking roughly $3.27M in escrowed assets into their Initia L1 wallet. The exploiter swapped portions of the stolen funds on the Initia DEX and bridged out 13.4K TIA, 8K USDC.inj, and 597K Noble USDC, hitting Initia’s automated outbound IBC rate limits, without extracting any native INIT tokens. Validators and core developers swiftly halted the Initia L1 network, trapping approximately $2.16M of the illicit proceeds on-chain while initiating a full ground-up infrastructure rebuild in an isolated environment alongside law enforcement recovery efforts.
Impact
Quick Summary Between November 6 and 8, 2026, a major supply chain security incident affected Keplr Wallet accounts created via Google or Apple social logins, which rely on Web3Auth's embedded authentication infrastructure. While initial reports indicated a multi-million-dollar theft across 44,000+ wallets, verified updates from Web3Auth and Keplr confirmed that the majority of observed on-chain sweep volume—totaling $6.01M across 44,000+ wallets—was executed as an automated whitehat rescue/recovery operation to secure vulnerable, un-drained user accounts before the attacker could reach them. Accounts created using traditional 12/24-word seed phrases or hardware wallets were completely unaffected. Details of the Exploit The incident was triggered by an upstream infrastructure vulnerability within Web3Auth's Key Management and Distributed Key Generation (DKG) pipeline for embedded social-login wallets, allowing arbitrary private keys for social-login users to be derived without user consent. After detecting unauthorized transactions on November 6, Web3Auth paused its embedded wallet service, and Keplr suspended Google/Apple logins at 04:38 UTC on November 7. To prevent complete depletion by the attacker, Web3Auth and Keplr launched an automated whitehat counter-sweep using the same derivation pathway, racing to extract funds into verified recovery wallets across eight primary Cosmos chains (including Cosmos Hub, Osmosis, Injective, Celestia, Akash, Noble, dYdX, and Babylon) as well as eight EVM-compatible networks, Axelar, Saga, and Agoric. To bypass the standard 21-day unbonding period on Cosmos Hub, the whitehat recovery script tokenized 1.96M staked ATOM into liquid share tokens before sweeping them alongside $251K in pending staking rewards. As of November 8, 2026, the $6.01M+ in rescued assets remains dormant in official Web3Auth recovery addresses, with Web3Auth and Keplr establishing a formal fund return process for affected users. Block Data Reference EVM Rec
Impact
Quick Summary On November 5, 2026, security firm TenArmor flagged an ongoing exploit targeting the TENDRIL/USDT liquidity pool on BNB Chain (BSC). The attacker executed a malicious transaction that extracted approximately $309,000 USD from the pool. Details of the Exploit The exploit targeted the TENDRIL/USDT liquidity pool via transaction 0xfdff4fba4327821c204af07944076ecaaee163a994398fdf4063d08712e40059 on BNB Chain. The attacker manipulated pool state dynamics using a 30M USDT flashloan to drain approximately $309,000 in USDT collateral. Exploit Transaction Hash: 0xfdff4fba4327821c204af07944076ecaaee163a994398fdf4063d08712e40059
Impact
Quick Summary On November 3, 2026, the InsurancePool and CoreVault contracts on BNB Chain (BSC) were exploited in a flash-loan-driven price oracle manipulation attack. The attacker leveraged a large flash loan to crash a spot market pool, inflating a vault redemption calculation by ~33x. This allowed the attacker to extract 259.09 BNB from the protocol's InsurancePool reserve, walking away with a net profit of 160.26 BNB (~$112,300 USD) after loan repayment. Details of the Exploit The root cause was a flaw in the protocol's redemption oracle helper, which fell back to the PancakeSwap v2 spot price when its primary TWAP and time-window samples were unpopulated or uninitialized. Executing via contract 0x92f521a7Fb4bC7Eb5B3951667cE58c261E52f542, the attacker took a massive flash loan of 207,358.41 WBNB (~$143.6M USD) from Lista DAO's Moolah market (0x8f73b65b4caaf64fba2af91cc5d4a2a1318e5d8c). The attacker dumped 195,000 WBNB into the OSK/WBNB PancakeSwap v2 liquidity pool to severely distort the spot price ratio (crashing WBNB price ~98x in the pool), triggered an inflated redemption against CoreVault, and extracted 260.21 WBNB from the reserve pool. The attacker then unwound the swap position to restore the liquidity pool state, repaid the Lista DAO flash loan in full, and transferred the net 160.26 WBNB profit (~$112.3K USD) to EOA 0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304. Block Data Reference Attacker Helper Contract: 0x92f521a7Fb4bC7Eb5B3951667cE58c261E52f542Attacker EOA: 0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304 Exploit Transaction Hash: 0x072a10a579e2a8afa26a681205a2aaaa38f74bcb9d1064b12bd9e9ebe2c598b3
Impact
Quick Summary In the early hours of November 2, 2026, Brazil’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Mercado Bitcoin, suffered a multi-chain security incident in which attackers drained approximately $38M to $49M in digital assets across 17 blockchains. Details of the Exploit The attack began at 01:22 UTC on November 2, 2026, with unauthorized wallet sweeps originating on Base and quickly expanding across 17 blockchains, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron, Polygon, Arbitrum, Avalanche, BNB Chain, and Stellar. Rather than exploiting smart contracts, the attacker authorized standard token transfers to sweep multi-chain hot wallets and thousands of user deposit addresses, indicating compromised withdrawal permissions or API signing access. Drained assets included 104.43 BTC (~$8.16M), 3,680 ETH, SOL, TRX, stablecoins, and extensive ERC-20 and SPL token holdings (including PEPE, ONDO, PENDLE, VIRTUAL, and UNI), which the attacker immediately began swapping into native ETH and BTC via decentralized exchanges. Blockchain security firms and stablecoin issuers intervened to freeze ~$11 million (including $6.2M+ in USDT/USDC), while Mercado Bitcoin initiated a full infrastructure review prior to restoring app services. Block Data Reference Primary Attacker Control Address (EVM): 0xe485e7A70b1131216Cb47CA4555c4Bbb2C742478
Impact
Quick Summary On October 31, 2026, b14g a Bitcoin liquid staking application deployed on the Core blockchain, suffered a smart contract exploit draining approximately 97.05 million CORE tokens (~$1.4M to $1.47M USD). The underlying Bitcoin staked via b14g remains time-locked on the native Bitcoin network and was completely unaffected. Details of the Exploit The breach was triggered by a single transaction that targeted 91 b14g staking positions by submitting withdrawal requests specifying an amount of 0 CORE. Due to a logic flaw in the interaction between b14g and Core's underlying staking contracts, passing a zero parameter was misinterpreted by the staking code as a request to release the maximum available staked balance for each targeted order. This allowed the attacker to extract 97.05M CORE into controlled wallets without putting up collateral or holding valid claim rights. Approximately 66 minutes post-incident, b14g paused its contracts to halt further unauthorized drains. On-chain tracing revealed that around 68 million CORE (~70% of stolen funds) remained unmoved on Core, while centralized exchanges (including Bybit and ChangeNOW/MEXC) succeeded in freezing approximately 9 million to 11 million CORE linked to the attacker. Block Data Reference Attacker Primary Control Addresses: 0xc556ed208285406d71705927f92d4f4eaea579f1 0x27758c30f8e424fbd8ca605bf31e9496c26ce92c
Impact
Quick Summary On October 31, 2026, decentralized options protocol Premia V3 suffered a smart contract exploit on Arbitrum, resulting in the loss of approximately $400,500 to $464,600 across six underwriter vaults (WBTC, WETH, USDC.e, and ARB call and put vaults). The attacker manipulated option pool creation and liquidity routing to extract vault collateral using flash-loaned capital. Details of the Exploit The exploit targeted six Premia V3 underwriter vaults on Arbitrum by abusing the interaction between vault collateral locking and newly initialized option pools. The attacker initially executed a setup transaction to create six custom, empty option pools. Using flash loans (including assets borrowed from Balancer), the attacker bought options across these new pools, which forced the victim underwriter vaults to lock their underlying collateral (WBTC, WETH, USDC.e, and ARB) into those specific option pools. Immediately following the collateral lock, the attacker exploited a liquidity withdrawal path within the pool mechanics to extract the collateral as liquidity, allowing them to pay back the flash loans while draining the vaults' direct balances down to near-zero. The stolen funds were subsequently bridged from Arbitrum to Ethereum and swapped into Bitcoin via cross-chain protocols Chainflip and NEAR Intents. Block Data Reference Impacted Vault Contracts: 0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea531 0xbae43c546DFADC69576aE73C68e0694A54F08e1B 0xD46993F25D298ebbCD31E941156C66f7e628A52a Exploiter Addresses: 0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBd 0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f Example Exploit Transaction Hash: 0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac
Impact
Quick Summary On October 29, 2026, the zkLink Nova cross-chain bridge escrow contracts on Ethereum were exploited for approximately $783,100 USD. The attack abused a publicly callable authorized SyncL2TxHashRelayer and a transient state-clearing flaw in the Arbitrator contract, enabling the attacker to reuse message hashes, spoof gateway identities, and withdraw assets using forged proofs. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability resided in the Arbitrator contract’s claimMessage function (0x1ee09a2caa0813a5183f90f5a6d0e4871f4c6002), which failed to clear the transient finalizeMessageHash or require a fresh authenticated callback for individual invocations. Utilizing the publicly callable and authorized SyncL2TxHashRelayer, the attacker first populated a valid hash and subsequently reused it while substituting EthereumGateway.sendMessage as the claim target. This execution tricked ZkLink.syncBatchRoot into running under the legitimate gateway identity, allowing the attacker to install a malicious l2LogsRootHashes root and drain ETH and ERC20 assets using forged Merkle proofs across two exploit transactions. Block Data Reference Attacker Addresses: 0xaca0655a11200a80d33d0e48786317304cde5718, 0xDAB137F390dF77caA97fd492540E973fd5e2F8c8 Victim Contracts: ZkLink Contract: 0x5fd9f73286b7e8683bab45019c94553b93e015cf L1ERC20Bridge: 0xad16edcf7deb7e90096a259c81269d811544b6b6 Vulnerable Arbitrator Contract: 0x1ee09a2caa0813a5183f90f5a6d0e4871f4c6002 (Implementation: 0x7a0bb4805ecb7fd3c8dabbe4afa0e91cb1761e34) Exploit Transaction Hashes: 0x4f3c23e75b9134e8cae5a462550daad42fbbc19242567fcc34c0a035e297462c 0x8a7e38b9c2a7a40981317ba87fbaa2e50527ec412cefc2fb4c9e3184f8848ae9
Impact
Quick Summary On October 29, 2026, starting at ~20:05 UTC, Binance suffered the largest security breach in crypto history, with an estimated ~$6.3B to $6.36B USD in gross outflows across ten blockchains. The attack utilized a compromised DevOps engineer laptop to reach internal service containers and hot-wallet signing infrastructure, executing 50 pre-signed EIP-7702 delegation authorizations on Ethereum to convert hot wallet Binance 14 into a self-executing sweeper. Stablecoin issuers and security councils responded rapidly to freeze ~$2.7B to $3.0B on-chain, while Binance confirmed it will cover all remaining net losses via its SAFU emergency fund and corporate reserves. Details of the Exploit The intrusion originated via an initial breach of a Binance DevOps engineer's laptop, which enabled the attacker to access internal service containers and trick the hot-wallet signing infrastructure without directly extracting raw private keys. Using this signing access, the attacker collected 50 sequential EIP-7702 delegation authorizations to account for nonce variations on Ethereum. At 20:20:59 UTC, the attacker submitted an authorization transaction that installed a malicious delegate sweeper contract (0x63e842b0...73e9c6fAe) onto hot wallet Binance 14 (0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60). Minutes later, a single sweep() call executed, draining $2.5B+ in ETH and ERC20 tokens. Concurrently, hot wallets across nine other blockchains (including Bitcoin, Tron, Solana, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Polygon, and XRP) were systematically drained via automated authorized transfers. The attacker also exercised delegated owner rights on a secondary smart account to pull 780M USDC, deposited stablecoins into Aave v3 to borrow ~19,762 ETH to bypass potential freezing, and panic-dumped non-freezable tokens into AMM pools. Industry issuers (Tether, Circle, Ripple, World Liberty) and the Arbitrum Security Council executed emergency freezes on ~$2.7B–$3.0B in assets, leaving unrecovered
Impact
Quick Summary On October 28, 2026, a TranchePool on the Avalanche C-Chain (associated with Valinor Digital, Oatfi, and Fence Finance) was drained of its entire USDC balance, totaling $1,013,353.61, due to a time-dependent credit accounting flaw in its daily rollover logic. Details of the Exploit The exploit relied on a flaw in the pool's automated settlement logic (_rollover()) that processed scheduled principal payments at the UTC day rollover by treating a scheduled due date as an actual cash-received payment, reducing outstandingPrincipal without verifying that USDC had arrived. Executing via a helper contract (0xf09dcf4ede2a88bd316ff355dfc333a281a57805), the attacker took a flash loan of 1,013,353.61 USDC from Aave v3 at 23:56:41 UTC on October 27, interacted with the TranchePool (0xe25cb545...), repaid Aave with a premium, and scheduled a principal repayment for midnight UTC. At 00:00:00 UTC on October 28, the rollover marked the scheduled payment as settled, lowering outstanding principal by ~1.013M USDC on paper; three seconds later at 00:00:03 UTC, the attacker re-called the draw path using identical calldata, successfully withdrawing the pool's remaining 1,013,353.61 USDC because capacity had been artificially restored. The stolen funds were quickly laundered off Avalanche via Circle's CCTP (depositForBurnWithHook), bridging ~250,000 USDC and ~763,375 USDC to Solana (Domain 5), after which Fence Finance issued an on-chain message offering a 10% bounty for the return of 90% of the funds. Block Data Reference Vulnerable TranchePool Address: 0xe25cb545bdd47a8ec2d08001cb5661b00d47621a Attacker Wallet: 0x6ff1c3ffa622e1062168f3497a275be9cc2b1246 Attacker Helper Contract: 0xf09dcf4ede2a88bd316ff355dfc333a281a57805
Impact
Quick Summary On October 27, 2026, BNB Chain prediction market Predict.fun suffered a security incident resulting in approximately $397,708 USDT being drained from 29 user smart wallets (Kernel/ZeroDev-based). Core protocol contracts remained unexploited, with unauthorized fund transfers executed using compromised user private keys. Details of the Exploit The incident unfolded in two waves targeting user smart wallets on BNB Chain. On-chain investigations confirmed that each withdrawal transaction was authorized and signed directly with the respective owner's private key. The project team attributed the compromise to a suspected security breach on their third-party hosted API documentation site, prompting them to take the portal offline as a precautionary measure. Stolen funds were subsequently laundered through Tornado Cash and Railgun. The team issued a public statement pledging full reimbursement to all affected users, pending a complete post-mortem investigation.
Impact
Quick Summary On October 26, 2026, a 2-of-7 Safe multisig on the Avalanche C-Chain holding approximately $7.45 million in trading inventory was drained due to stale, unlimited token approvals left pointing to an uninitialized address (0x3725bd4d175283108156c3f15f86e1c51266155d). Details of the Exploit The vulnerability stemmed from a multichain configuration dating back to March 7, 2026, when the team granted unlimited spending allowances (for WAVAX, USDC, WETH.e, and BTC.b) to 0x3725bd4d175283108156c3f15f86e1c51266155d. On other EVM chains (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum), this address hosted the team's custom pool contract. However, on Avalanche, the address was entirely empty and uninitialized because Safe's deterministic CreateCall contract had never been deployed there. An attacker (0x4c48b79b...) discovered this and deployed CreateCall via the Safe singleton factory, advanced the contract nonce through 12 throwaway deployments, and deployed a sweeper contract at the exact target address (landing at the 13th deployment). This claimed the address and allowed the sweeper to invoke transferFrom using the stale unlimited approvals. However, an MEV bot (0x36b112875f921e51f5ea8ff39b374960694d21b3) successfully front-ran the transaction in the same block, capturing 3.09M USDC, 350.4K WAVAX, 182 WETH.e, and 10.79 BTC.b (~$7.45M total). The original attacker's transaction reverted. The MEV bot operator agreed on-chain with the Safe owners to return the bulk of the assets in exchange for a 42,500 WAVAX (~$371K) bounty. Block Data Reference Vulnerable / Target Address: 0x3725bd4d175283108156c3f15f86e1c51266155d Victim Safe Address: 0x631fca4a73aee699638634479132452ef354b9b8 Original Attacker Address: 0x4c48b79b97516719444056d2bf0dc9564138fa0a MEV Bot Address: 0x36b112875f921e51f5ea8ff39b374960694d21b3 Original Attack Transaction Hash (Reverted): 0xf1f87d370290afe269ae8eb30fe8e5e4694ad153914a2de6d980641f4a331289 MEV Bot Interception Transaction Hash: 0xf88a7960a07832e1bf5b
Impact
Quick Summary On October 24, 2026, Ethereum DeFi protocol X100 suffered a flash-loan governance attack against its three-seat Senate. Attackers realized ~$4.85M USDT across multiple transactions (with additional X tokens extracted) by acquiring Senate seats via flash loans, executing instantaneous un-timelocked proposals, and dumping treasury assets. Details of the Exploit The exploit stemmed from severe architectural vulnerabilities in X100's governance model, specifically, instant execution without timelocks, absence of voting snapshots, and a three-seat Senate controlled dynamically by the largest locked X token balances in the "Freezer" treasury contract. The primary attacker borrowed ~$1.94M USDT from Aave, bought X tokens, and locked them into two smart contracts to out-stake existing members by a marginal 0.000001 X, seizing two of the three Senate seats. Controlling a 2/3 voting majority, the attacker immediately submitted and passed a proposal forcing the Freezer to sell 400,000 X (worth ~$20.3M on paper) into a newly created, low-liquidity pool for just ~$35.68 USDT. The attacker then extracted the 400,000 X, dumped a portion into the main Uniswap V3 pool to realize ~$4.75M USDT, and repaid the flash loan, all within a single atomic transaction (0x38c6...). Subsequent copycat attackers used the open Senate seats to burn/extract remaining Uniswap V3 LP positions and pull an additional ~550,000 X tokens, realizing a combined ~$4.85M USDT. The primary attacker converted proceeds into 2,022.86 ETH, with portions later deposited into Tornado Cash. Block Data Reference Primary Attack Transaction: 0x38c60844f1923d53fdce7d99e9bc2a2d8c73a08e793341dfbb479f8cc74d81d0 Exploiter Addresses Primary Attacker 1: 0x7ec2afdF3eC5964899894f8D58afa95cbB8FfD63 Primary Attacker 2: 0xfc3fAcD67138966aB0c841E905B0C4BCA1AbE92F Copycat Attacker 3: 0xDAB137F390dF77caA97fd492540E973fd5e2F8c8 Victim Contracts / Token: 0x79F35A33FE2813414851c4Ae8daeacD14d822A46 (Freezer) / 0x100A2C7F45Fd4
Impact
Quick Summary On October 23, 2026, the Solana-based $kimchi token suffered a coordinated KOL pump-and-dump rug pull that netted scammers over $385,000 in profit after artificially inflating the asset's market capitalization to approximately $14 million. Details of the Exploit The scheme began when Solana-focused influencer @kimchi1x received 500 million $kimchi tokens and published a promotional post, which was promptly reposted by @a1lon9. Capitalizing on the sudden social media hype, the token's market capitalization surged to a peak of roughly $14 million. Shortly after the price spike, the promotional repost was undone and the original post was deleted, triggering an immediate market collapse of over 95%. On-chain tracing revealed that the operators behind the scheme utilized multiple pre-funded wallets to acquire tokens at negligible entry prices and systematically liquidate them at peak valuation, extracting more than $385,000 in net profits at the expense of retail traders. Block Data Reference Scammer Associated Wallets: 4RZDCgCGyifMvciAy3gjNbbyxNjoYp3nHe6meWUymxL4 98xo3EMWR1Xc4aWUHmn8DD4onMqeDuopRiT2hWeMeiFH 5qVRRiL5HmUXFupQBk2QQ34fhf2boPwhQvZk8yMiwg9M
Impact
Quick Summary On October 23, 2026, Layer-1 network Initia and its rollups were halted following a zero-day vulnerability in its MoveVM implementation on the Cosmos SDK. An attacker minted $7.48M in unbacked face-value tokens (USDC, AUSD, WETH, iUSD) across 13 seconds and drained $2.73M in real coins from cross-chain bridge reserves. Stolen funds were consolidated into 1,135.5 ETH ($2,730,000) on Ethereum, while validators halted the network 42 minutes after minting began. D etails of the Exploit The security incident stemmed from a MoveVM script-caching and state-validation bug connecting Initia's execution engine with the Cosmos SDK. At 14:59:26 UTC, a single account executed transactions that forged $7.48M in unbacked face-value token supplies without modifying the underlying global totals. Over the subsequent 33 minutes, the attacker initiated cross-chain peg-outs across LayerZero adapters and Circle's CCTP via Noble, drawing down real reserve collateral. Noble's USDC backing reserve plummeted 99.99% from $1.09M to $63 by 15:37 UTC, causing normal user withdrawals to bounce. All extracted proceeds were swapped into 1,135.5 ETH (~$2.73M USD) and consolidated into an Ethereum mainnet address. Validators instituted an emergency chain halt 42 minutes post-mint, and exchanges such as Kraken and Upbit suspended INIT deposits and withdrawals. Block Data Reference Destination Address (Ethereum): 0x358ef017a5aa516dcd81bdc80b18cde41cac8
Impact
Quick Summary On October 21, 2026, onchain commerce protocol Slice on Base was exploited for approximately $41,000 USD. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability exploited by the attacker resided in the FundsModule contract's handling of external source contracts, where the 0x9d2edfac function accepted release amounts returned by user-specified contracts without verifying asset transfers. To exploit this, the attacker deployed two custom source contracts that reported nonzero asset release amounts while transferring zero assets to the protocol. With the execution flag set to true, the contract utilized these unbacked, fraudulent figures to compute immediate withdrawals from the shared pooled reserves. This logic flaw enabled the attacker to drain approximately $41,000 in pooled ETH and USDC reserves directly to their EOA (0xc34572ebb26b9a4c54854aae8d2347108e8c892f) in a single transaction (0x02b039a6345348d984e4a0b70dd233127772206e61ce82c390c4709c0b8d790a). Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x02b039a6345348d984e4a0b70dd233127772206e61ce82c390c4709c0b8d790a Attacker Address: 0xc34572ebb26b9a4c54854aae8d2347108e8c892f Victim (FundsModule Proxy): 0x61bcd1ed11fc03c958a847a6687b1875f5eacaaf Vulnerable Implementation: 0x8db3b6f51b594dc87b87a3a3b844de9c0d8d60b5
Impact
Quick Summary On October 19, 2026, decentralized lending platform BiFi was exploited for approximately $165,600 USD (165.6K USDT) due to an interest rate calculation logic flaw triggered after a 36-day period of market inactivity. The attack was successfully front-run and executed by white-hat/MEV bot c0ffeebabe.eth. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability existed within BiFi's USDT market contract (0x808c...), specifically inside TokenHandler._checkFirstAction. Because the market had been idle for approximately 264,000 blocks (~36 days), _checkFirstAction recorded this block gap as inactiveActionDelta and froze actionEXR once per block. However, subsequent actions within the same block repeatedly re-ran interestModel.getInterestAmount, calculating globalEXR = actionEXR × (1 + rate × 264K). Because rate was calculated dynamically based on live deposit/borrow utilization, an attacker could manipulate market utilization and apply the full 36-day accrued interest rate on every single contract call within that block. The original attacker deployed the exploit contract at block 262,102,55. One block later (block 262,102,56), MEV bot c0ffeebabe.eth front-ran the execution, taking a 40.5M USDT flash loan from Morpho, depositing it in tranches, and borrowing 30M USDT to spike utilization. Through a repeated repay/withdraw loop, the bot extracted the artificially inflated deposit interest, netting 165.6K USDT (swapped to WETH). Block Data Reference Original Attacker Deployment Tx: 0x15b47e2c0daf723dec64c75b435079d3a1f8a6058b21b9a64dda4844e877a034 (Block 262,102,55) Front-Run Execution Tx: 0x756c68055af7a0630aa0b56891ba4de14c56c39cbebe99e47eeb4728f4d6ad14 (Block 262,102,56) Original Attacker Address: 0x7c78a049fff71609990017b58a959e926e6ec4c6 MEV / Front-Runner Address: 0xc0ffeebabe5d496b2dde509f9fa189c25cf29671 (c0ffeebabe.eth) Victim Contract: 0x808c3ba97268dbf9695b1ec10729e09c7e67a9e3
Impact
Quick Summary Between October 17 and October 18, 2026, Layer-1 network Qubic experienced a wallet seed generation exploit resulting in approximately 2.94 trillion QU (~$1.3M – $1.4M USD) being drained across 1,404 accounts. The issue stemmed from weak pseudo-random number generation (Math.random()) in the front-end wallet seed creation layer rather than a core blockchain protocol flaw. Details of the Exploit The incident occurred due to insufficient entropy/randomness during wallet seed creation across specific environments, specifically seeds generated using Math.random() on iOS/iPadOS browsers, Safari on macOS (prior to October 18, 2026), and early versions of the Qubic iOS app (prior to July 2025). An attacker brute-forced the predictable seed derivations and systematically drained 1,404 affected wallets between 23:42 UTC on Oct 17 and 01:26 UTC on Oct 18. In response, network operators (Computors) coordinated a protective network halt at tick 85,371,949. As a result of the halt, 87.1% of the drained tokens remained immobilized on-chain, while the remaining 12.9% sent to CEX platform MEXC was frozen by the exchange. The core team deployed version 4.26.4 replacing Math.random() with cryptographically secure randomness (crypto.getRandomValues()).
Impact
Quick Summary On October 14, 2026, UNCX Network’s Vesting V2 contracts were exploited across four distinct chains for a total of approximately $1.49 million USD due to a share-accounting logic flaw in schedule release and cancellation functions. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability stemmed from inconsistent accounting of _totalTokenShares between the release() and cancel() functions within UNCX Vesting V2 contracts. The attacker initialized multiple vesting schedules, fully released a subset of them, and then transferred tokens directly into the vesting contract as a donation to artificially lower the shares-per-token rate without minting new shares. By subsequently topping up and canceling the released schedules, the attacker manipulated the vesting parameters such that cancel() incorrectly deducted shares that had already been removed by prior releases. This forced an underflow or artificial reduction in the shared _totalTokenShares denominator, which massively inflated the redemption payout of the attacker's final retained schedule. The attacker repeated this loop to drain funds across multiple tokens and chains, resulting in ~$969k on BSC, ~$242k on Ethereum, ~$169k on Robinhood Chain, and ~$114k on Base.
Impact
Quick Summary On October 13, 2026, crypto gambling platform Gamdom suffered a multi-chain hot wallet compromise resulting in an estimated $4.208 million stolen ($3.0M+ self-reported) across EVM chains, Solana, Bitcoin, and TRON. The breach stemmed from an unauthorized server connection originally flagged as a hardware disk issue. Details of the Exploit The incident originated when platform monitoring flagged a suspected server disk failure approximately 24 hours prior to the breach. During hardware diagnostics, an unauthorized connection was discovered on an automated backend server responsible for hot wallet withdrawal signing, enabling the attacker to initiate unauthorized transfers. On-chain analysis indicates $2.2 million was drained across EVM networks (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism), $965,000 from Solana, $668,000 from Bitcoin, and $375,000 from TRON. Stolen assets were routed through cross-chain bridges and decentralized exchanges, including THORChain and Hyperliquid. Gamdom halted hot wallet withdrawals, secured remaining funds in cold storage, and initiated platform auditing before resuming services.
Impact
Quick Summary On October 12–13, 2026, Autheo Network’s native THEO token on Base suffered an unbacked cross-chain mint exploit resulting in the unauthorized creation of 19 million THEO tokens. The attacker dumped the minted tokens into liquidity pools on Base for ~298.9 ETH (~$750,000 USD net exploit profit), causing THEO's market price to crash by over 92%. Details of the Exploit The incident stemmed from a vulnerability in the cross-chain message verification system/trusted relayer for Autheo Network. This permitted an "unbacked cross-chain mint" on Base, allowing the attacker to mint 19 million THEO tokens out of thin air from the null address without locking corresponding assets on the source chain. The attacker subsequently dumped 19M THEO across DEX pools (including Hydrex Integral) on Base, extracting ~298.9 ETH (~$750K USD). The attacker then bridged 280.45 ETH to Ethereum Mainnet via Relay bridge. While initial security alerts reported a $1.76M loss based on the destination wallet's total balance of 700.8 ETH, on-chain tracing verified that the address already held ~400.8 ETH prior to the attack, establishing the actual net exploit loss at ~298.9 ETH (~$750,000 USD). Following the attack, Autheo Network issued an urgent security notice instructing users to stop trading and bridging THEO while investigations remain ongoing.
Impact
Quick Summary On October 10, 2026, synthetic perpetuals platform Papertrade suffered a ~$1.28 million USD drain from its shared USDC liquidity pool approximately eight hours after launching on HyperEVM. A trader executed a cross-venue oracle price manipulation scheme, using large spot trades on Hyperliquid to shift the reference BBO mid-price while holding up to 1000x leveraged positions on Papertrade. Details of the Exploit The exploit stemmed from an economic oracle mechanism vulnerability combined with overly permissive launch open-interest (OI) limits. Papertrade operated without an order book or market makers, routing all synthetic long/short trades against a unified USDC liquidity pool with settlement based directly on the Hyperliquid Best Bid and Offer (BBO) midpoint. Taking advantage of high 1000x leverage caps, a trader (0x20256...) opened massive positions on Papertrade (including a ~$297M notional short position with 660x leverage). The trader then bought and sold large quantities of spot ETH (e.g., buying 6,060 ETH to lift prices by ~$3, or 0.12%) on Hyperliquid. Given the 1000x leverage, a minor 0.12% spot price shift amplified position margins by over 120%, enabling the trader to extract $1.28M in net profits from the counterparty liquidity pool at a total spot trading fee cost of ~$52,000. Following the incident, Papertrade lowered its on-chain and relayer OI caps to render future manipulation attempts economically unfeasible (-EV)
Impact
Quick Summary On October 9, 2026, BitBay’s UsdcDaiV4Vault on Polygon was exploited for approximately ~$14,800 USD ( 14,838.47 DAI ) due to an edge-case logic flaw in _withdraw() that transferred the contract's entire DAI balance when vault liquidity equaled zero. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability existed in BitBay's DAI/USDC vault contract (0x048E...) within its internal _withdraw() function. The logic contained a faulty check: when vault liquidity == 0, it transferred the entire token balance held by the vault contract directly to the caller instead of capping the payout to the user's proportional share holding. The attacker executed reposition() to force the vault into a zero-liquidity state, then redeemed just 1 minimal share unit. This triggered the zero-liquidity withdrawal branch and allowed the attacker to extract the entire balance of 14,838.47 DAI. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x5b795dc5c5e1665b712c7ccf478c1d8c59a162d698f4e0bfb40bd303e04a7ff2 Attacker Address: 0x59Ae3c8dd50063429D86BdaEBbC350fB64e9884B Vulnerable Contract: 0x048E88311ca84876aeA086125825492e2AF2e5A0 (UsdcDaiV4Vault)
Impact
Quick Summary On October 8, 2026, X7 Finance’s X7Pioneer contract on Ethereum was exploited for approximately 6.78 ETH (~$16,514 USD) due to a reward accounting logic flaw in claimRewards() that repeatedly credited unrecorded ETH balances when called with an empty token array. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability existed in the X7Pioneer contract (0x7000...) within its claimRewards() function, which incremented totalRewards by address(this).balance - lastETHBalance on every invocation but updated lastETHBalance only when claimable > 0. The attacker purchased X7 Pioneer NFT #300 for 0.15 ETH and donated additional ETH directly to the contract to widen the balance delta, then repeatedly invoked claimRewards() passing an empty array to keep claimable at zero. Because lastETHBalance was never updated, each empty-array call repeatedly added the same unrecorded ETH delta to totalRewards, artificially inflating the per-token reward index. The attacker then claimed the inflated rewards to drain 6.78 ETH from the contract, subsequently routing 3.3 ETH into Tornado Cash and transferring the remaining proceeds across secondary wallet addresses. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xc98056d6ab55ef898189da5fa1fb08b968cb84ca99528d171f8240836b21766d Attacker Address: 0xc79352119a7cf6efbfabbd7e6b013b79687bacf2 Vulnerable Contract: 0x70000299ee8910ccacd97b1bb560e34f49c9e4f7
Impact
Quick Summary On October 7–8, 2026, DeFi staking protocol 79thVault on BNB Smart Chain suffered a privileged account breach resulting in approximately $12.51M to $14.35M stolen. Details of the Exploit The incident stemmed from weak access control management and a compromised operational private key tied to the unverified 79AU token contract. The contract contained a privileged function assigned to a single OPERATOR_ROLE address without multisig or timelock safeguards, which had historically been used to pull 79AU tokens from the PancakeSwap liquidity pool for reward distribution. The attacker utilized this key to execute seven privileged transactions, moving 2.01 million 79AU tokens out of the pool without payment. The attacker then dumped the extracted tokens back into the pool for USDT, draining the pool's dollar reserves and swapping the proceeds into 16,249 BNB. The stolen assets were consolidated into fresh addresses, primarily 0xa953...2F89 holding ~14,385 BNB, while a small test transfer of 30 BNB was deposited into KuCoin. The team revoked the operator privileges, deployed emergency contract patches, and opened on-chain white-hat bounty negotiations with the attacker.
Impact
Quick Summary On October 4, 2026, an unnamed Aave v3 adapter vault on Base was drained of 1,783.07 wstETH (~$6.0 million USD). The attacker withdrew the Aave interest-bearing tokens (aBaswstETH), redeemed them for wstETH, and initiated cross-chain bridging to Ethereum. Details of the Exploit The incident occurred via admin key compromise or unauthorized privilege execution rather than a smart contract code bug in Base or Aave core protocol. The attacker seeded gas via Tornado Cash on Ethereum and bridged 0.05 ETH to Base address 0x0B51...B034. The attacker deployed an unverified contract (0xcdfe...569d). Shortly after, the vault's governing 3-of-7 Safe multisig (0x6b27...) executed a transaction calling __setWhitelist__ to approve the attacker's contract. The whitelisted contract executed six consecutive pulls to drain 1,783.07 aBaswstETH from the adapter, redeemed the tokens for underlying wstETH on Aave v3, and transferred 1,001 wstETH into the native Base-to-Ethereum withdrawal queue while leaving 782.07 wstETH sitting on Base in address 0xC734...7f8D. An additional ~11,760 aWETH remaining in the adapter was left untouched. Block Data Reference Target Adapter Contract: 0xd1895f2019c2152fc2b9022d57f19198c4cfcabc Owner Safe Address (3-of-7): 0x6b27512a5943Ed327f6cb6C3EC1f0398229f42C4 Attacker Deployer Address: 0x0B5126e1bc27C0de77e02e97945760A674EdB034 Attacker Whitelisted Contract: 0xcdfe91301356da873562ef513828a60dba1f569d Fund Destination Address: 0xC73448432a05deeA5Ea18a07D3b5d9ccf6297f8D
Impact
Quick Summary On October 3, 2026, the MALT protocol on Polygon was exploited for ~$72,000 USD due to a smart contract state-ordering flaw that misattributed treasury-funded rebalancing capital as user-supplied swap liquidity. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability was caused by an input attribution and state snapshot flaw within the swap(uint256,uint256,address) function of contract 0xfe6C, which snapshotted pre-swap pool reserves and caller input before executing an external rebalanceHook prior to output transfer. During execution, the hook withdrew DAI from the protocol's Capital Source and deposited it directly into the pool; however, the swap function then validated its invariant against the pool's final balances without separating caller-supplied tokens from protocol-funded rebalancing capital. Exploiting this lack of isolation, the attacker supplied a negligible input to trigger the mid-swap treasury liquidity injection and subsequently withdrew a disproportionately large payout of MALT tokens from pool 0xF0d3. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x915eccb5791508aa89a0a3f1385b26346b127ebb648b046e4cb558474ce8445b Attacker Address: 0x8F103B6A0aD705bcE6357842A5fefEB49e8D83Ef Victim / Pool Address: 0xF0d314849A3Bc9270a79110F25dBA2c8325A2AAC Vulnerable Contract: 0xfe6C096a2871337d4f6F7DD04Ebda733E94D7A13
Impact
Quick Summary On October 2, 2026, GoldPesa’s GPXHooks contract on Base was exploited for ~$114,900 USD due to a smart contract vulnerability in its liquidity rebalancing accounting, which failed to verify zero currency deltas on a shared, flash-accounted PositionManager during Uniswap v4 hook interactions. Details of the Exploit The attacker opened a PoolManager unlock and minted an unsettled WETH/USDC position to create a -$115k USDC phantom debt on the shared manager. By triggering reBalance() via a swap, the hook burned its real liquidity for a +$148.8k USDC credit, but the attacker's phantom debt absorbed the vast majority of it, leaving the hook with only ~$33.9k. The attacker then burned their own position to clear the debt and withdrew $114.9k USDC directly from PoolManager, before converting the proceeds to 96.4k USDT and bridging off Base via Rango Router. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x5c1febd5047c2a15c37988b6abd5c8b984236dddf6fd24eed96b0f43951ad2c9 Attacker Address: 0x4a5FD2e9357cC87DF4cD6A1808174DBc8646899F Vulnerable Contract: 0x4519e2b040ff1B64fa03aBe2AeF0BC99D7CcEaA8
Impact
Quick Summary On October 1, 2026, cross-chain protocol NEAR Intents was exploited for approximately $3,8 million following a hot wallet drain on BNB Smart Chain caused by an integration bug in its Omni bridge infrastructure. On-chain analysis linked the attacker to North Korea's Lazarus Group, while the protocol team patched the flaw and pledged full user reimbursement. Details of the Exploit The attack stemmed from an integration logic flaw between NEAR Intents smart contracts and its Omni deposit/withdrawal layer on BNB Smart Chain, allowing the attacker to execute unauthorized hot wallet withdrawals. The attacker extracted ~$3.865M on BSC, routed a portion toward KuCoin, bridged funds to Ethereum, and executed seven Chainflip swaps to acquire ~33.7 BTC (~$2.9M), which remains parked across four unspent Bitcoin addresses. On-chain tracking confirmed the attacker interacted with known Lazarus Group infrastructure (0x098B7...E2f96). In response, NEAR Intents patched the contract-side flaw, temporarily suspended Omni bridge operations across 11 chains, and guaranteed 100% user compensation from protocol reserves. Block Data Reference BSC Attack Hashes: 0x9fe58e031f73bbd880c782bc9e7446bcda32cadb304a729209871a4a81856c4c 0x0381265d6a1bb09de899f49f410a8b907cd548358a7e3c91076c3a52656b8220 0x69d1c68c7e961a0199d3c9f3b6a31cb168ed775ef34b51a42762253ac1efcceb 0x9c10b967da0c85631ec105e3b322c0a851fcd01b69ff390ff58f860e5cce003a
Impact
Quick Summary On September 30, 2026, the MCN Labs LPBonus contract on BNB Smart Chain was exploited for ~$92,600 USD (1,442,165.71 FIST) due to a reward accounting logic flaw that used inconsistent MSN reserve values during reward accrual versus withdrawal calculations. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability was located in MCN Labs' LPBonus contract (0x5227...), which used inconsistent MSN reserve values to track reward distributions. The AddFistFee function updated the global reward index (oneshareFIST) by dividing newly acquired FIST rewards by the MSN reserve present at accrual time. However, CalcPendingUser later multiplied this index by a user weight calculated from the MSN reserve present at claim time. The attacker manipulated the reserve down to ~89.33 MSN during reward accrual, then inflated it to ~491.11 MSN before executing UserRemoveLp. This calculation mismatch enabled a newly registered LP to claim 1,442,165.71 FIST despite the intervening reward pool receiving only 940,041.61 FIST in legitimate funding. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xecac1563bbb76fb8fefb4a7da4592260a8c1ddde21d7da62b78a9e3769808e6b Attacker Address: 0xb6fff29dd2b5423a159e50877fc4af7a54e76f7a Vulnerable Contract: 0x52272524a22f941f5489c1233732797314bb054b
Impact
Quick Summary On September 29, 2026, the FastSwap protocol on BNB Smart Chain was exploited in an on-chain attack detected by TenArmor, resulting in an estimated loss of approximately $92,600 USD. Details of the Exploit An attacker executed a malicious transaction targeting the FIST token and FastSwap smart contracts (0xc9882def23bc42d53895b8361d0b1edc7570bc6a) on BNB Smart Chain. The exploit allowed the attacker to manipulate protocol contracts and drain liquidity pools, extracting ~$92.6K in value within a single transaction. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xecac1563bbb76fb8fefb4a7da4592260a8c1ddde21d7da62b78a9e3769808e6b Target Token / Contract: 0xc9882def23bc42d53895b8361d0b1edc7570bc6a
Impact
Quick Summary On September 26–27, 2026, scammers deployed a fake OP Stack Layer 2 network impersonating the unreleased GIWA Mainnet (Chain ID 9134) and set up a fraudulent bridge. 1,335 user addresses deposited 767.65 ETH into the fake bridge to trade on DYORSWAP, allowing the scammers to extract 766.25 ETH (~$2.0 million USD) on Ethereum. Details of the Exploit The incident was a fake infrastructure scam rather than a smart contract flaw in DYORSWAP's protocols. Scammers configured a malicious network using GIWA's official Chain ID (9134) alongside a fake bridge and OP Stack batcher. When traders connected to the fake RPC and deposited ETH to trade on DYORSWAP, the malicious bridge contract captured the L1 funds. The scammers drained 766.25 ETH at Ethereum block 26,067,309. DYORSWAP confirmed its core contracts were safe, published a claims collection form, and distributed over 200 ETH from its treasury to compensate affected users while tracing the scammers' funding sources.
Impact
Quick Summary On September 24, 2026, privacy-focused stablecoin payment protocol Payy Network suffered a security breach on its rollup contract, resulting in the drain of ~$1.83 million in USDC. The stolen funds were swapped for 683.38 ETH and dispersed across three external addresses. Details of the Exploit The exploit targeted Payy Network's RollupV1 contract via a forged verifyRollup batch transaction that reportedly compromised or misused protocol prover and validator keys. Two days prior to the attack, the attacker seeded gas into the attack wallet using the Railgun privacy protocol. During the exploit, the attacker extracted ~1.83 million USDC, converted it into ~683 ETH, and distributed the proceeds across four fresh destination addresses (~200 ETH, ~280 ETH, ~200 ETH, and 1 ETH) where they currently sit unmoved. An additional ~90.2k USDC remains held in the attacker's entry wallet and has not been blacklisted by Circle. In response, Payy Network halted all rollup bridge transactions, deposits, and withdrawals while initiating investigation and recovery efforts.
Impact
Quick Summary On September 24, 2026, crypto casino and sportsbook platform Duelbits suffered a multi-chain hot wallet compromise resulting in estimated total losses of $4.9M to $7.0M across Ethereum, BNB Chain, Tron, Bitcoin, and Solana. The platform took its services offline to investigate and refill operational hot wallets while user cold storage remained unaffected. Details of the Exploit The attack was executed via a private key compromise targeting Duelbits' operational hot wallets across five blockchains. On EVM chains, the attacker extracted 836 ETH, 1.146M USDT, 209 BNB, 96.8K USDC, 31.5K DAI, and 12.4B SHIB, alongside 8.1 BTC on Bitcoin and 192K TRX on Tron. The attacker routed the stolen multi-chain assets through swap protocols and cross-chain bridges, converting the proceeds into Ether and consolidating approximately 2,234.6 ETH (~$6.0M) into a single destination Ethereum address. Duelbits confirmed the hot wallet breach and suspended operations pending system remediation and hot wallet refilling. Block Data Reference Attacker EVM Address 1: 0xA77e24Fe29d16E051e487ef4Ea7b056cb05aef76 Attacker EVM Address 2: 0x6761c9b15815f4051773EDe39B42B95bdDB3EF1c Attacker Bitcoin Address: bc1qhtu84kz3y94lvgl2t05zk84tqh57grvd82zvcl Attacker Tron Address: TAvraZZFCZbDSZoyqWWRRsBkFgZqKaCGbK Attacker Solana Address: A3EBrhMBEGzcPgmbwywSPhW39G6PFGrorU8ib99T6yKw
Impact
Quick Summary On September 24, 2026, centralized exchange Bitget suffered a major infrastructure breach resulting in ~$351.6 million stolen from its hot and warm wallet layers. Bitget paused withdrawals while confirming its cold wallets remained secure and stating that its $464M+ User Protection Fund will fully reimburse user losses. Details of the Exploit The attacker penetrated Bitget's core wallet backend infrastructure and spoofed internal transaction data to trigger authorized withdrawals across multiple blockchains without compromising private keys. Stolen assets included ETH, XRP, USDT, USDC, AVAX, and BNB. On EVM chains, the attacker converted most of the stolen proceeds into 67,982 ETH (~$183 million). On-chain analysis and VPN traffic patterns linked the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group (specifically the TraderTraitor subgroup) through bridged funds connected to the earlier AFX Trade exploit. Bitget contained the breach, stopped further unauthorized transfers, and is preparing system recovery before resuming withdrawals.
Impact
Quick Summary On September 23–24, 2026, Meter.io suffered a dual consensus and bridge exploit after an attacker leveraged a block validation flaw on Meter mainnet and exploited the Meter Passport bridge on BNB Chain, resulting in ~$2.3 million in unbacked wMTRG minted and partially dumped on PancakeSwap. Details of the Exploit On September 23 at 21:14 UTC, an attacker exploited a block validation flaw on the Meter mainnet consensus layer to mint unbacked MTR and MTRG tokens. The attacker then used the Meter Passport bridge on BNB Chain across two main transactions to mint approximately $2.3 million in unbacked wrapped MTRG (wMTRG), dumping a portion into PancakeSwap liquidity pools and bridging funds out. Meter paused both mainnet and bridge operations, invalidated transactions post-block 100731417, and issued a 72-hour whitehat bounty offer of 10% for the return of funds. Block Data Reference Attacker Addresses: 0xee2eeeed4ed8580669ed924abeb49f27f7d0bd65 0x44cf94496091150865e192a86c07b90a9760b43d 0x7db6ac6Fa3c8aa2c6FB9BdCD4800e8BAacDd2EE8 Abused Token Contract (BSC): 0xBd2949F67DcdC549c6Ebe98696449Fa79D988A9F Sample Exploit Transaction (BSC): 0x2745dd5121eb03d1979cf229f432a422137942ede186d9fa0129a2f83401eeef Bounty Return Address: 0xB980Ff36A99C0C3B408279E025d8E2DA7eF65105
Impact
Quick Summary On September 22, 2026, Cosmos ecosystem DEX Astroport suffered a security breach on the Neutron chain that exposed protocol admin controls. Validators halted Neutron and Cosmos Hub to coordinate an emergency response, intercepting approximately 1.396 million ATOM (~$2.53 million USD) before the attacker could cash out. Details of the Exploit The attacker compromised admin privileges for Astroport contracts on Neutron, placing liquidity across connected pools at risk. The attacker converted stolen funds into ATOM and initiated a streaming swap of 200,000 ATOM to ETH via THORChain. Only 15.5% of the swap filled (19.92 ETH) before Cosmos Hub halted at block 33,086,740. Cosmos Hub validators deployed a binary upgrade that transferred 1,227,121 ATOM from the attacker's account to a recovery multisig and added an ante-handler to block the attacker's key from signing future transactions. An additional 168,990 ATOM refund remains queued on THORChain, requiring a secondary sweep once GAIA chain processing unhalts. Astroport contracts on Terra were unaffected after their admin connection to Neutron was severed. Block Data Reference Attacker Cosmos Address: cosmos1dd25c4sshelrpfs0433apg24c5phrhk8m96c4n
Impact
Quick Summary On September 21, 2026, the Internet Token protocol on Base was exploited for 5.85 WETH and 764 million INT after an attacker leveraged an unvalidated Uniswap V3 pool callback parameter to arbitrarily mint ~925 million INT tokens. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability was present in INT's LiquidityUnifier contract (0x837d...), which held MINTER_ROLE rights and exposed an unvalidated swapV3(token, pool) function. The function only validated that the passed pool parameter contained bytecode and that its token0() and token1() getters returned the INT token address. The attacker deployed a malicious contract returning INT for both token endpoints, causing swapV3 to invoke pool.swap(). This callback re-entered uniswapV3SwapCallback and minted an arbitrary amount of INT tokens directly to the fake pool. The attacker routed the minted tokens through a Convertor contract round-trip to bypass validateSupply sanity checks, created ~925 million INT, dumped a portion into the official INT/WETH V3 pool for 5.85 WETH, and kept the remaining ~764 million INT. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xed62bb27bd1058d3d7cc93d55421d6d0001ced8cb4529b02773f5126a4edb08b Attacker Address: 0x5f7ce6395818857ac20730dc990f614356d1ec68 Victim Contract: 0x837dbabc4f5fa78baf177597edbda09645822032
Impact
Quick Summary On September 21, 2026, the RWC token protocol on BNB Smart Chain was hit by an on-chain attack detected by TenArmor, resulting in an estimated loss of approximately $109,000 USD. Details of the Exploit An attacker executed a malicious transaction targeting the RWC contract on BNB Smart Chain, exploiting a smart contract vulnerability to drain funds from the project's liquidity or protocol pools. Security monitoring systems flagged the atomic execution trace after ~$109,000 in value was extracted. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x9c919da34696425913f32587f00d2838031a8726a2c5ddfa39e33a45b36e6427
Impact
Quick Summary On September 19–20, 2026, an attacker used compromised SingularityNET bridge and NuNet deployer private keys to drain $FET and mint unauthorized supplies of $AGIX,$NTX, $WMTx, and $CGV on Ethereum. The attacker extracted ~$1.44M to $1.67M in liquid ETH before project teams paused bridges and revoked minting authorities. Details of the Exploit The exploit resulted from compromised private signing keys rather than smart contract logic bugs. On September 19, the attacker called conversionIn on Fetch.ai's TokenConversionManagerV3 using a stolen SingularityNET authorizer signature to drain 8.72M $FET (~$1.53M) and swap it for ETH. Minutes later, a compromised NuNet deployer account minted 408.53M $NTX to reach its 1 billion supply cap. On September 20, the attacker used the SingularityNET bridge authority to mint 260M $AGIX, 53.84M $WMTx, and ~500M$CGV. High slippage on low liquidity pools limited total extracted value to 546–649 ETH (~$1.44M–$1.67M), while token market prices collapsed by 65% to 99%. Affected protocols responded by pausing bridges, revoking signing authorities, and contacting exchanges to freeze funds. Block Data Reference Attacker Address: 0x2dcc1085fDCf418B421E45e86e4e54637cc21dfE NuNet Deployer Address: 0x863F13e5B505f1Eb17803b94EC9d3DaF80092165 Fetch.ai Conversion Contract: 0xab424A430CC09864fA1277A38193111705ADF3A3
Impact
Quick Summary On September 17, 2026, Starknet money market Nostra Finance suffered an oracle price manipulation exploit resulting in ~$3.53 million in unauthorized borrows across ETH, STRK, USDC, USDT, WBTC, and DAIv1 against inflated NSTR collateral, forcing the protocol to pause all lending, borrowing, and liquidation operations. Details of the Exploit The attacker exploited Nostra Finance's collateral valuation oracle for NSTR by manipulating its underlying price pool on Ekubo DEX. The attacker withdrew existing liquidity around NSTR's real market price, seeded a decoy liquidity band at $99 per NSTR, and routed a $14.72 dust swap (190 NSTR) through the gap to artificially inflate the oracle price by 16,645x. Using just 294,177 NSTR collateral, normally worth ~$1,756, the attacker leveraged the inflated valuation to draw $3,531,922.97 in mixed assets across six borrowing legs. The attacker then bridged ~$1.93 million (234.57 ETH and 1.3M DAI) to Ethereum while leaving ~$1.55 million in assets on Starknet. Block Data Reference Starknet Attacker Contract: 0x06d48ef7ab62c26e3ef1987c322096cd508e9034c82048783a6b438fc1344bc3 Ethereum Destination Address: 0xa059aaab82773caf622de9d9a0f2dbf9aa7f3c37
Impact
Quick Summary On September 16, 2026, legacy Ethereum yield-aggregator Flamincome (associated with Flamingo Finance) suffered an oracle and vault share price manipulation exploit, resulting in a net attacker profit of $345,902.67 USDT via an $18.09 million Morpho flash loan. Details of the Exploit The attacker targeted legacy 2020-era VaultYUSDT strategy contracts that calculated asset holdings and share values using Curve's manipulable virtual price. Using an $18.09 million USDT flash loan borrowed from Morpho, the attacker staked Curve USDP LP tokens into the strategy contract to artificially inflate the vault's share pricing and Net Asset Value (NAV). With the share valuation artificially elevated, the attacker redeemed their oversized shares for liquid aUSDT from Aave at a favorable exchange rate, repaid the $18.09 million flash loan in the same atomic transaction, and extracted $345,902.67 USDT in profit. Block Data Reference On-Chain Key Addresses: Attacker Primary Address: 0x83381e7f7232775735169d72d237b858ffc36871 Target Strategy / Vault: 0xb8d6471ca573c92c7096ab8600347f6a9fe268a5 Exploit Contract 1: 0x875da4bd7b4a52a806a533b1cf6d6ff92365d2e6 Exploit Contract 2: 0x1c7eacef3630e764519e6ea2e8caa2bdb7d8b486
Impact
Quick Summary On September 16, 2026, a social engineering campaign disguised as a Cloudflare human verification check targeted meme coin traders on DEX aggregators like DexScreener and Axiom. Bypassing Web3 wallet signatures entirely, the attack tricking victims into running local OS-level scripts resulted in total reported losses exceeding $600,000. Details of the Exploit Attackers embedded malicious URLs within public token metadata fields on DEX aggregators. Visiting these links redirected users to a fake Cloudflare page that silently copied a malicious PowerShell command to the system clipboard while prompting the sequence Win + R + Ctrl + V + Enter. Running the payload via native Windows tools bypassed browser security, installing an infostealer that granted attackers full host access to extract private keys, browser session credentials, and drain irectly ~$600,000 from top trader.
| When | Protocol | Type | Impact | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
2d ago Nov 18, 2026 | Gonka AI Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary On November 18, 2026, decentralized AI network Gonka AI suffered an exploit on its Ethereum cross-chain bridge (0x972a7A92D92796a98801A8818bcF91f1648f2F68), resulting in approximately $1.05M–$1.06M in total losses across roughly five transactions. Details of the Exploit Under Gonka AI's cross-chain architecture, redemptions and token issuances on Ethereum require cryptographic signatures verified against a rotating epoch BLS group key representing the network's validator set. The attacker (0x6650a1CB0c3B970a0e4CEd26984fe06DB7844D80) executed an unauthorized rotation of the bridge contract's epoch BLS group key, which simultaneously serves as the WGNK ERC-20 token contract, effectively hijacking the bridge's signature verification and authorization mechanism. Using self-signed authorizations under the rogue BLS key across roughly five transactions (including 0xa6b23e579b004e47657fd8f963a1f5732c5063a7d6eb7f9d7b185cd05d487178), the exploiter drained the bridge's remaining ~$884,800 in USDT and USDC liquidity reserves and minted approximately $172,000 in unbacked WGNK tokens without locking native GNK in escrow on the Gonka chain. The stolen assets and newly minted tokens were subsequently routed through Uniswap and dispersed across multiple wallets to complicate recovery efforts. Block Data Reference Vulnerable Bridge / Token Contract: 0x972a7A92D92796a98801A8818bcF91f1648f2F68 (Gonka Bridge / WGNK) Primary Attacker Address: 0x6650a1CB0c3B970a0e4CEd26984fe06DB7844D80 Example Exploit Transaction: 0xa6b23e579b004e47657fd8f963a1f5732c5063a7d6eb7f9d7b185cd05d487178 | De.Fi↗ |
2d ago Nov 18, 2026 | K3 Capital Ethereumreported | Flash loan attack | Quick Summary On November 18, 2026, K3 Capital’s sBOLD yield vault on Ethereum Mainnet (an ERC-4626 wrapper built over Liquity V2 Stability Pools) was completely drained of its ~$3.42M–$3.43M TVL across 97 transactions. Triggered by a swap-validation and share-pricing accounting mismatch, the initial attacker and a competitive wave of MEV copycat bots extracted the vault's BOLD liquidity, with ~59% of the stolen value captured by Ethereum block builders (in MEV bribes) and one copycat bot, while the initial attacker bridged ~$520K (~291 ETH) to Bitcoin via THORChain and Maya Protocol. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability stemmed from an accounting and swap-verification flaw in the sBOLD vault (0x50Bd66D59911F5e086Ec87aE43C811e0D059DD11), which checked how much BOLD a collateral swap returned without verifying that the router actually spent the same token and amount used to calculate the output requirement, while also ignoring unswapped collateral balances below a set threshold when pricing vault shares. The initial attacker (0xDC0e2FDEb89D2F363F2EA1B50E923d464C414dAA) used flash-loaned wstETH and a helper contract (0x19Ad153B83f9a1cbCAc2182DcEf14D0E825A9634) to leave uncounted WETH in the vault, mint sBOLD shares at an artificially depressed valuation, trigger a swap so the vault's share price jumped to include the newly converted BOLD, redeem existing depositors' BOLD at the inflated rate, and recover their temporary WETH via a second swap priced against 1 wei of wstETH using a lingering WETH approval. Within minutes, MEV searchers and copycat bots replicated the exploit across 97 transactions over eight minutes, with a single copycat bot extracting $1.91M (56%) and paying $1.78M in bribes to Ethereum block builders, before K3 Capital paused the contracts at 13:08 UTC, while the initial attacker swapped ~291 ETH (~$520K) into ~8.07 BTC across eight Bitcoin addresses via THORChain and Maya Protocol. Block Data Reference Vulnerable Vault Contract: 0x50Bd66D59911F | De.Fi↗ |
4d ago Nov 16, 2026 | Lighter Ethereummitigated | Access control | Quick Summary On November 16, 2026, decentralized perpetual futures exchange Lighter suffered an incident resulting in ~$15.48M in compromised market-maker funds across two accounts, of which $10,393,057 USDC was withdrawn off-platform while ~$5.09M USDC was intercepted and recovered before exiting. Details of the Exploit The root cause was cryptographic nonce reuse in external trader signing code, which enabled the attacker to mathematically reconstruct API private keys from publicly visible signatures for two large market-maker accounts (#714710 and #714723). Because Lighter permitted API keys to manage positions and transfer funds between accounts or pools tied to the same underlying address without requiring a fresh Layer 1 wallet signature, the attacker closed the victims' open trading positions, created a 0%-fee public liquidity pool under a compromised account, deposited ~$10,000 to claim 99.99% of pool shares, and funneled the victims' USDC into the pool in ~$1M increments before redeeming the shares. At 10:11 UTC, the attacker withdrew 10,393,057 USDC from Lighter's Ethereum settlement contract to wallet 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387, swapping the funds into ~5,752–5,764 ETH via CoW Swap within minutes and routing 160 ETH batches through Relay and LI.FI across multiple wallets to Hyperliquid to purchase XMR1. Lighter swiftly paused withdrawals and pool creation, activated Guardian mode, and executed a Security Council contract upgrade—successfully intercepting and returning the second ~$5.09M USDC tranche to the affected trader before resuming operations later the same day with mandatory wallet-signature requirements on transfers. Block Data Reference Primary Attacker Address (Ethereum): 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387 | De.Fi↗ |
6d ago Nov 14, 2026 | Kava Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On November 14, 2026, the Kava blockchain's native lending protocol, Kava Lend, suffered a major exploit resulting in the drain of approximately 55.2 million KAVA tokens (worth ~$3.76M pre-attack). The exploit caused the price of KAVA to plunge by nearly 40% to 50%. Details of the Exploit The attack targeted Kava Lend’s dormant BUSD stablecoin market, where the protocol’s interest rate calculation guarded against a net supply of exactly zero but failed to protect against near-zero figures. By repaying existing open loans and calibrating deposits and withdrawals to leave the pool's net supply at just 2 base units, the attacker caused the BUSD supply index to multiply roughly 243,000-fold within three minutes, artificially inflating their BUSD deposit claim to over 1.25 billion BUSD on paper. Using a secondary helper wallet, the attacker repeatedly deposited BUSD as collateral, withdrew the real tokens via the inflated claim, borrowed KAVA against the phantom collateral, and self-liquidated the helper one block later, forcing the empty pool to wipe out the debt while leaving the helper with the borrowed tokens across 127 rounds over 98 minutes, draining the KAVA pool from 55.33 million down to 0.19 tokens. Six hours later, the attacker bridged ~49.2 million KAVA to BNB Chain via LayerZero and sold 48.4 million KAVA within 35 minutes through aggregators including MetaMask Swaps and CoW Protocol for ~$2.09 million in BNB and USDT, subsequently routing proceeds into XMR1 on Hyperliquid and cross-chain bridges like LI.FI and Chainflip. Relay bridge intercepted and froze $612,416 USDT (29% of the sale proceeds) under a BLOCKED_WALLET flag, while Kava paused the Axelar bridge as a precaution and major exchanges including Upbit, Bithumb, and Coinone halted KAVA deposits and withdrawals. | De.Fi↗ |
8d ago Nov 12, 2026 | Edel Finance Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary On November 12, 2026, tokenized equity lending protocol Edel Finance disclosed that approximately $300,000 worth of its native $EDEL tokens were stolen and subsequently sold across the open market. Details of the Exploit The incident involved the unauthorized extraction and rapid market liquidation of ~$300,000 in $EDEL tokens, which drove immediate downward sell pressure on the token (trading near ~$0.0123 following a broader weekly decline from ~$0.0180). While the exact root cause and attack vector (such as smart contract logic vs. treasury/operational wallet compromise) have not yet been publicly specified, the attack occurred one day after Softstack published a penetration test covering Edel Finance's perpetual futures backend infrastructure and four months after the protocol suffered a separate ~$403,000 flash-loan oracle manipulation exploit on July 1, 2026. Emergency containment measures with centralized exchanges successfully froze a portion of the stolen tokens during the off-ramp attempt, with formal post-mortem details awaiting verification by the team. | De.Fi↗ |
11d ago Nov 9, 2026 | Arcus Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary On November 9, 2026, decentralized finance protocol Arcus suffered a security breach resulting in the theft of approximately $2.23 million in USDG tokens. The attacker rapidly laundered and bridged all stolen funds out via Relay Protocol within 50 minutes, distributing the proceeds across Ethereum and Bitcoin. Details of the Exploit The attacker successfully drained approximately $2.23M in USDG from Arcus and immediately initiated a multi-chain laundering cascade using Relay Protocol. Within 50 minutes of the exploit, the USDG was bridged over to Ethereum and swapped into roughly 475 ETH and ~$1.01 million in DAI. Simultaneously, ~$208,000 of the proceeds were routed across to Bitcoin utilizing THORChain and Relay. On-chain intelligence has mapped out the primary holding addresses where the bulk of the unrecovered proceeds currently sit. Block Data Reference Primary Attacker / Holding Addresses: 0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd (Ethereum) 0x9a30f6a596f3354ecb90d6bd3a2a16750dcf13d0 (Ethereum) bc1qtlme3nlwhlrcdjw5xv8g83t8fakw6snze79wn7 (Bitcoin) | De.Fi↗ |
11d ago Nov 9, 2026 | Ankr Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary In November 9th 2026, cross-chain infrastructure provider Ankr suffered a security breach resulting in approximately $304,500 in losses. The attack exploited a receipt-validation flaw where the bridge processed forged cross-chain withdrawal receipts bearing valid signatures from a trusted consensus signer without independently checking them against actual source-chain events. Details of the Exploit The attacker submitted five separate fraudulent cross-chain withdrawal transactions referencing a single legitimate Optimism transaction (0x02e805b5...). By altering the recipient address, token type, and withdrawal amounts while keeping valid signatures from the bridge's consensus key mechanism, the attacker bypassed verification logic in the vulnerable target contract (0xc437DF90...). This allowed the withdraw() function to release assets to the attacker's designated recipient address (0x119D250b...) multiple times using the same reused source context. SlowMist’s investigation noted that while the receipts carried genuine consensus signatures, the exact origin of those signatures remained under active review, with signer key compromise still unconfirmed at the time of reporting. Block Data Reference Attacker / Tx Sender Address: 0x9A88Dd45AE846A979705c9cFdfD0f229e592D703 Beneficiary Recipient Address: 0x119D250b82C1cf5345dF5912EFb4B1a4107a1Aa6 Vulnerable Bridge Contract: 0xc437DF90B37C1dB6657339E31BfE54627f0e7181 Exploit Transaction Hashes: 0x7310af5d53e08259915bc3547daf343d188b9c36db8dd6b3ff3b5e70565e88df 0x90c563360cc343a640721662abe762e9ab9665aee0c22820b1656ff23bcfc891 0xde2d5b455c0071698fec9c23a9c50f9ecdfd8efa96b4fbb48ed0620bd4c29b5c 0x91ba1a9c81a1bb67ce7a2779d5b2de54b7aece166f67d9e3a31e29e4e13c2886 0x46e20d4c8cd43dece94f7a2a890a348fefcb0dc8310279658c8f836e758bdad0 | De.Fi↗ |
11d ago Nov 9, 2026 | Initia Unknown chainreported | Access control | Quick Summary On November 9, 2026 marking Initia's second major security incident within a month, an attacker breached Initia’s cloud and rollup hosting infrastructure via a command injection exploit using a compromised Google Cloud Platform (GCP) key. By pivoting from exposed environment variables to GitHub, GCP, and Anvil (Initia's rollup hosting platform), the attacker validated forged Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) withdrawals across five rollups, unlocking ~$3.27M from Initia L1’s IBC escrow accounts. Emergency network halts trapped $2.16M of the stolen funds on the paused L1, limiting net bridged-out losses to ~$1.11M before outbound IBC rate limits halted further exits. Details of the Exploit The attack originated when the intruder exploited a command injection vulnerability using a compromised GCP key designated for provisioning private nodes, exposing sensitive environment variables. Leveraging those exposed secrets, the attacker accessed Initia’s GitHub and GCP environments to harvest additional credentials, ultimately compromising Anvil, the hosting platform managing Initia's interconnected rollups. With privileged access to Anvil, the attacker forged and validated fraudulent IBC withdrawal proofs across five rollups, successfully unlocking roughly $3.27M in escrowed assets into their Initia L1 wallet. The exploiter swapped portions of the stolen funds on the Initia DEX and bridged out 13.4K TIA, 8K USDC.inj, and 597K Noble USDC, hitting Initia’s automated outbound IBC rate limits, without extracting any native INIT tokens. Validators and core developers swiftly halted the Initia L1 network, trapping approximately $2.16M of the illicit proceeds on-chain while initiating a full ground-up infrastructure rebuild in an isolated environment alongside law enforcement recovery efforts. | De.Fi↗ |
14d ago Nov 6, 2026 | Keplr Unknown chainresolved | Access control | Quick Summary Between November 6 and 8, 2026, a major supply chain security incident affected Keplr Wallet accounts created via Google or Apple social logins, which rely on Web3Auth's embedded authentication infrastructure. While initial reports indicated a multi-million-dollar theft across 44,000+ wallets, verified updates from Web3Auth and Keplr confirmed that the majority of observed on-chain sweep volume—totaling $6.01M across 44,000+ wallets—was executed as an automated whitehat rescue/recovery operation to secure vulnerable, un-drained user accounts before the attacker could reach them. Accounts created using traditional 12/24-word seed phrases or hardware wallets were completely unaffected. Details of the Exploit The incident was triggered by an upstream infrastructure vulnerability within Web3Auth's Key Management and Distributed Key Generation (DKG) pipeline for embedded social-login wallets, allowing arbitrary private keys for social-login users to be derived without user consent. After detecting unauthorized transactions on November 6, Web3Auth paused its embedded wallet service, and Keplr suspended Google/Apple logins at 04:38 UTC on November 7. To prevent complete depletion by the attacker, Web3Auth and Keplr launched an automated whitehat counter-sweep using the same derivation pathway, racing to extract funds into verified recovery wallets across eight primary Cosmos chains (including Cosmos Hub, Osmosis, Injective, Celestia, Akash, Noble, dYdX, and Babylon) as well as eight EVM-compatible networks, Axelar, Saga, and Agoric. To bypass the standard 21-day unbonding period on Cosmos Hub, the whitehat recovery script tokenized 1.96M staked ATOM into liquid share tokens before sweeping them alongside $251K in pending staking rewards. As of November 8, 2026, the $6.01M+ in rescued assets remains dormant in official Web3Auth recovery addresses, with Web3Auth and Keplr establishing a formal fund return process for affected users. Block Data Reference EVM Rec | De.Fi↗ |
15d ago Nov 5, 2026 | Tendril Usdt Pool BNB Chainreported | Flash loan attack | Quick Summary On November 5, 2026, security firm TenArmor flagged an ongoing exploit targeting the TENDRIL/USDT liquidity pool on BNB Chain (BSC). The attacker executed a malicious transaction that extracted approximately $309,000 USD from the pool. Details of the Exploit The exploit targeted the TENDRIL/USDT liquidity pool via transaction 0xfdff4fba4327821c204af07944076ecaaee163a994398fdf4063d08712e40059 on BNB Chain. The attacker manipulated pool state dynamics using a 30M USDT flashloan to drain approximately $309,000 in USDT collateral. Exploit Transaction Hash: 0xfdff4fba4327821c204af07944076ecaaee163a994398fdf4063d08712e40059 | De.Fi↗ |
17d ago Nov 3, 2026 | Insurancepool Corevault Oracle BNB Chainreported | Flash loan attack | Quick Summary On November 3, 2026, the InsurancePool and CoreVault contracts on BNB Chain (BSC) were exploited in a flash-loan-driven price oracle manipulation attack. The attacker leveraged a large flash loan to crash a spot market pool, inflating a vault redemption calculation by ~33x. This allowed the attacker to extract 259.09 BNB from the protocol's InsurancePool reserve, walking away with a net profit of 160.26 BNB (~$112,300 USD) after loan repayment. Details of the Exploit The root cause was a flaw in the protocol's redemption oracle helper, which fell back to the PancakeSwap v2 spot price when its primary TWAP and time-window samples were unpopulated or uninitialized. Executing via contract 0x92f521a7Fb4bC7Eb5B3951667cE58c261E52f542, the attacker took a massive flash loan of 207,358.41 WBNB (~$143.6M USD) from Lista DAO's Moolah market (0x8f73b65b4caaf64fba2af91cc5d4a2a1318e5d8c). The attacker dumped 195,000 WBNB into the OSK/WBNB PancakeSwap v2 liquidity pool to severely distort the spot price ratio (crashing WBNB price ~98x in the pool), triggered an inflated redemption against CoreVault, and extracted 260.21 WBNB from the reserve pool. The attacker then unwound the swap position to restore the liquidity pool state, repaid the Lista DAO flash loan in full, and transferred the net 160.26 WBNB profit (~$112.3K USD) to EOA 0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304. Block Data Reference Attacker Helper Contract: 0x92f521a7Fb4bC7Eb5B3951667cE58c261E52f542Attacker EOA: 0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304 Exploit Transaction Hash: 0x072a10a579e2a8afa26a681205a2aaaa38f74bcb9d1064b12bd9e9ebe2c598b3 | De.Fi↗ |
18d ago Nov 2, 2026 | Mercado Bitcoin Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary In the early hours of November 2, 2026, Brazil’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Mercado Bitcoin, suffered a multi-chain security incident in which attackers drained approximately $38M to $49M in digital assets across 17 blockchains. Details of the Exploit The attack began at 01:22 UTC on November 2, 2026, with unauthorized wallet sweeps originating on Base and quickly expanding across 17 blockchains, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron, Polygon, Arbitrum, Avalanche, BNB Chain, and Stellar. Rather than exploiting smart contracts, the attacker authorized standard token transfers to sweep multi-chain hot wallets and thousands of user deposit addresses, indicating compromised withdrawal permissions or API signing access. Drained assets included 104.43 BTC (~$8.16M), 3,680 ETH, SOL, TRX, stablecoins, and extensive ERC-20 and SPL token holdings (including PEPE, ONDO, PENDLE, VIRTUAL, and UNI), which the attacker immediately began swapping into native ETH and BTC via decentralized exchanges. Blockchain security firms and stablecoin issuers intervened to freeze ~$11 million (including $6.2M+ in USDT/USDC), while Mercado Bitcoin initiated a full infrastructure review prior to restoring app services. Block Data Reference Primary Attacker Control Address (EVM): 0xe485e7A70b1131216Cb47CA4555c4Bbb2C742478 | De.Fi↗ |
20d ago Oct 31, 2026 | B14g Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 31, 2026, b14g a Bitcoin liquid staking application deployed on the Core blockchain, suffered a smart contract exploit draining approximately 97.05 million CORE tokens (~$1.4M to $1.47M USD). The underlying Bitcoin staked via b14g remains time-locked on the native Bitcoin network and was completely unaffected. Details of the Exploit The breach was triggered by a single transaction that targeted 91 b14g staking positions by submitting withdrawal requests specifying an amount of 0 CORE. Due to a logic flaw in the interaction between b14g and Core's underlying staking contracts, passing a zero parameter was misinterpreted by the staking code as a request to release the maximum available staked balance for each targeted order. This allowed the attacker to extract 97.05M CORE into controlled wallets without putting up collateral or holding valid claim rights. Approximately 66 minutes post-incident, b14g paused its contracts to halt further unauthorized drains. On-chain tracing revealed that around 68 million CORE (~70% of stolen funds) remained unmoved on Core, while centralized exchanges (including Bybit and ChangeNOW/MEXC) succeeded in freezing approximately 9 million to 11 million CORE linked to the attacker. Block Data Reference Attacker Primary Control Addresses: 0xc556ed208285406d71705927f92d4f4eaea579f1 0x27758c30f8e424fbd8ca605bf31e9496c26ce92c | De.Fi↗ |
20d ago Oct 31, 2026 | Premia Labs Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 31, 2026, decentralized options protocol Premia V3 suffered a smart contract exploit on Arbitrum, resulting in the loss of approximately $400,500 to $464,600 across six underwriter vaults (WBTC, WETH, USDC.e, and ARB call and put vaults). The attacker manipulated option pool creation and liquidity routing to extract vault collateral using flash-loaned capital. Details of the Exploit The exploit targeted six Premia V3 underwriter vaults on Arbitrum by abusing the interaction between vault collateral locking and newly initialized option pools. The attacker initially executed a setup transaction to create six custom, empty option pools. Using flash loans (including assets borrowed from Balancer), the attacker bought options across these new pools, which forced the victim underwriter vaults to lock their underlying collateral (WBTC, WETH, USDC.e, and ARB) into those specific option pools. Immediately following the collateral lock, the attacker exploited a liquidity withdrawal path within the pool mechanics to extract the collateral as liquidity, allowing them to pay back the flash loans while draining the vaults' direct balances down to near-zero. The stolen funds were subsequently bridged from Arbitrum to Ethereum and swapped into Bitcoin via cross-chain protocols Chainflip and NEAR Intents. Block Data Reference Impacted Vault Contracts: 0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea531 0xbae43c546DFADC69576aE73C68e0694A54F08e1B 0xD46993F25D298ebbCD31E941156C66f7e628A52a Exploiter Addresses: 0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBd 0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f Example Exploit Transaction Hash: 0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac | De.Fi↗ |
22d ago Oct 29, 2026 | Zklink Nova Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 29, 2026, the zkLink Nova cross-chain bridge escrow contracts on Ethereum were exploited for approximately $783,100 USD. The attack abused a publicly callable authorized SyncL2TxHashRelayer and a transient state-clearing flaw in the Arbitrator contract, enabling the attacker to reuse message hashes, spoof gateway identities, and withdraw assets using forged proofs. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability resided in the Arbitrator contract’s claimMessage function (0x1ee09a2caa0813a5183f90f5a6d0e4871f4c6002), which failed to clear the transient finalizeMessageHash or require a fresh authenticated callback for individual invocations. Utilizing the publicly callable and authorized SyncL2TxHashRelayer, the attacker first populated a valid hash and subsequently reused it while substituting EthereumGateway.sendMessage as the claim target. This execution tricked ZkLink.syncBatchRoot into running under the legitimate gateway identity, allowing the attacker to install a malicious l2LogsRootHashes root and drain ETH and ERC20 assets using forged Merkle proofs across two exploit transactions. Block Data Reference Attacker Addresses: 0xaca0655a11200a80d33d0e48786317304cde5718, 0xDAB137F390dF77caA97fd492540E973fd5e2F8c8 Victim Contracts: ZkLink Contract: 0x5fd9f73286b7e8683bab45019c94553b93e015cf L1ERC20Bridge: 0xad16edcf7deb7e90096a259c81269d811544b6b6 Vulnerable Arbitrator Contract: 0x1ee09a2caa0813a5183f90f5a6d0e4871f4c6002 (Implementation: 0x7a0bb4805ecb7fd3c8dabbe4afa0e91cb1761e34) Exploit Transaction Hashes: 0x4f3c23e75b9134e8cae5a462550daad42fbbc19242567fcc34c0a035e297462c 0x8a7e38b9c2a7a40981317ba87fbaa2e50527ec412cefc2fb4c9e3184f8848ae9 | De.Fi↗ |
22d ago Oct 29, 2026 | Binance Staked ETH Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary On October 29, 2026, starting at ~20:05 UTC, Binance suffered the largest security breach in crypto history, with an estimated ~$6.3B to $6.36B USD in gross outflows across ten blockchains. The attack utilized a compromised DevOps engineer laptop to reach internal service containers and hot-wallet signing infrastructure, executing 50 pre-signed EIP-7702 delegation authorizations on Ethereum to convert hot wallet Binance 14 into a self-executing sweeper. Stablecoin issuers and security councils responded rapidly to freeze ~$2.7B to $3.0B on-chain, while Binance confirmed it will cover all remaining net losses via its SAFU emergency fund and corporate reserves. Details of the Exploit The intrusion originated via an initial breach of a Binance DevOps engineer's laptop, which enabled the attacker to access internal service containers and trick the hot-wallet signing infrastructure without directly extracting raw private keys. Using this signing access, the attacker collected 50 sequential EIP-7702 delegation authorizations to account for nonce variations on Ethereum. At 20:20:59 UTC, the attacker submitted an authorization transaction that installed a malicious delegate sweeper contract (0x63e842b0...73e9c6fAe) onto hot wallet Binance 14 (0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60). Minutes later, a single sweep() call executed, draining $2.5B+ in ETH and ERC20 tokens. Concurrently, hot wallets across nine other blockchains (including Bitcoin, Tron, Solana, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Polygon, and XRP) were systematically drained via automated authorized transfers. The attacker also exercised delegated owner rights on a secondary smart account to pull 780M USDC, deposited stablecoins into Aave v3 to borrow ~19,762 ETH to bypass potential freezing, and panic-dumped non-freezable tokens into AMM pools. Industry issuers (Tether, Circle, Ripple, World Liberty) and the Arbitrum Security Council executed emergency freezes on ~$2.7B–$3.0B in assets, leaving unrecovered | De.Fi↗ |
23d ago Oct 28, 2026 | Tranchepool Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 28, 2026, a TranchePool on the Avalanche C-Chain (associated with Valinor Digital, Oatfi, and Fence Finance) was drained of its entire USDC balance, totaling $1,013,353.61, due to a time-dependent credit accounting flaw in its daily rollover logic. Details of the Exploit The exploit relied on a flaw in the pool's automated settlement logic (_rollover()) that processed scheduled principal payments at the UTC day rollover by treating a scheduled due date as an actual cash-received payment, reducing outstandingPrincipal without verifying that USDC had arrived. Executing via a helper contract (0xf09dcf4ede2a88bd316ff355dfc333a281a57805), the attacker took a flash loan of 1,013,353.61 USDC from Aave v3 at 23:56:41 UTC on October 27, interacted with the TranchePool (0xe25cb545...), repaid Aave with a premium, and scheduled a principal repayment for midnight UTC. At 00:00:00 UTC on October 28, the rollover marked the scheduled payment as settled, lowering outstanding principal by ~1.013M USDC on paper; three seconds later at 00:00:03 UTC, the attacker re-called the draw path using identical calldata, successfully withdrawing the pool's remaining 1,013,353.61 USDC because capacity had been artificially restored. The stolen funds were quickly laundered off Avalanche via Circle's CCTP (depositForBurnWithHook), bridging ~250,000 USDC and ~763,375 USDC to Solana (Domain 5), after which Fence Finance issued an on-chain message offering a 10% bounty for the return of 90% of the funds. Block Data Reference Vulnerable TranchePool Address: 0xe25cb545bdd47a8ec2d08001cb5661b00d47621a Attacker Wallet: 0x6ff1c3ffa622e1062168f3497a275be9cc2b1246 Attacker Helper Contract: 0xf09dcf4ede2a88bd316ff355dfc333a281a57805 | De.Fi↗ |
24d ago Oct 27, 2026 | Predict FUN BNB Chainreported | Access control | Quick Summary On October 27, 2026, BNB Chain prediction market Predict.fun suffered a security incident resulting in approximately $397,708 USDT being drained from 29 user smart wallets (Kernel/ZeroDev-based). Core protocol contracts remained unexploited, with unauthorized fund transfers executed using compromised user private keys. Details of the Exploit The incident unfolded in two waves targeting user smart wallets on BNB Chain. On-chain investigations confirmed that each withdrawal transaction was authorized and signed directly with the respective owner's private key. The project team attributed the compromise to a suspected security breach on their third-party hosted API documentation site, prompting them to take the portal offline as a precautionary measure. Stolen funds were subsequently laundered through Tornado Cash and Railgun. The team issued a public statement pledging full reimbursement to all affected users, pending a complete post-mortem investigation. | De.Fi↗ |
25d ago Oct 26, 2026 | Safe Multisig Draining Unknown chainresolved | Other | Quick Summary On October 26, 2026, a 2-of-7 Safe multisig on the Avalanche C-Chain holding approximately $7.45 million in trading inventory was drained due to stale, unlimited token approvals left pointing to an uninitialized address (0x3725bd4d175283108156c3f15f86e1c51266155d). Details of the Exploit The vulnerability stemmed from a multichain configuration dating back to March 7, 2026, when the team granted unlimited spending allowances (for WAVAX, USDC, WETH.e, and BTC.b) to 0x3725bd4d175283108156c3f15f86e1c51266155d. On other EVM chains (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum), this address hosted the team's custom pool contract. However, on Avalanche, the address was entirely empty and uninitialized because Safe's deterministic CreateCall contract had never been deployed there. An attacker (0x4c48b79b...) discovered this and deployed CreateCall via the Safe singleton factory, advanced the contract nonce through 12 throwaway deployments, and deployed a sweeper contract at the exact target address (landing at the 13th deployment). This claimed the address and allowed the sweeper to invoke transferFrom using the stale unlimited approvals. However, an MEV bot (0x36b112875f921e51f5ea8ff39b374960694d21b3) successfully front-ran the transaction in the same block, capturing 3.09M USDC, 350.4K WAVAX, 182 WETH.e, and 10.79 BTC.b (~$7.45M total). The original attacker's transaction reverted. The MEV bot operator agreed on-chain with the Safe owners to return the bulk of the assets in exchange for a 42,500 WAVAX (~$371K) bounty. Block Data Reference Vulnerable / Target Address: 0x3725bd4d175283108156c3f15f86e1c51266155d Victim Safe Address: 0x631fca4a73aee699638634479132452ef354b9b8 Original Attacker Address: 0x4c48b79b97516719444056d2bf0dc9564138fa0a MEV Bot Address: 0x36b112875f921e51f5ea8ff39b374960694d21b3 Original Attack Transaction Hash (Reverted): 0xf1f87d370290afe269ae8eb30fe8e5e4694ad153914a2de6d980641f4a331289 MEV Bot Interception Transaction Hash: 0xf88a7960a07832e1bf5b | De.Fi↗ |
27d ago Oct 24, 2026 | X100 Ethereumreported | Flash loan attack | Quick Summary On October 24, 2026, Ethereum DeFi protocol X100 suffered a flash-loan governance attack against its three-seat Senate. Attackers realized ~$4.85M USDT across multiple transactions (with additional X tokens extracted) by acquiring Senate seats via flash loans, executing instantaneous un-timelocked proposals, and dumping treasury assets. Details of the Exploit The exploit stemmed from severe architectural vulnerabilities in X100's governance model, specifically, instant execution without timelocks, absence of voting snapshots, and a three-seat Senate controlled dynamically by the largest locked X token balances in the "Freezer" treasury contract. The primary attacker borrowed ~$1.94M USDT from Aave, bought X tokens, and locked them into two smart contracts to out-stake existing members by a marginal 0.000001 X, seizing two of the three Senate seats. Controlling a 2/3 voting majority, the attacker immediately submitted and passed a proposal forcing the Freezer to sell 400,000 X (worth ~$20.3M on paper) into a newly created, low-liquidity pool for just ~$35.68 USDT. The attacker then extracted the 400,000 X, dumped a portion into the main Uniswap V3 pool to realize ~$4.75M USDT, and repaid the flash loan, all within a single atomic transaction (0x38c6...). Subsequent copycat attackers used the open Senate seats to burn/extract remaining Uniswap V3 LP positions and pull an additional ~550,000 X tokens, realizing a combined ~$4.85M USDT. The primary attacker converted proceeds into 2,022.86 ETH, with portions later deposited into Tornado Cash. Block Data Reference Primary Attack Transaction: 0x38c60844f1923d53fdce7d99e9bc2a2d8c73a08e793341dfbb479f8cc74d81d0 Exploiter Addresses Primary Attacker 1: 0x7ec2afdF3eC5964899894f8D58afa95cbB8FfD63 Primary Attacker 2: 0xfc3fAcD67138966aB0c841E905B0C4BCA1AbE92F Copycat Attacker 3: 0xDAB137F390dF77caA97fd492540E973fd5e2F8c8 Victim Contracts / Token: 0x79F35A33FE2813414851c4Ae8daeacD14d822A46 (Freezer) / 0x100A2C7F45Fd4 | De.Fi↗ |
28d ago Oct 23, 2026 | Kimchi Token Unknown chainconfirmed | Rugpull | Quick Summary On October 23, 2026, the Solana-based $kimchi token suffered a coordinated KOL pump-and-dump rug pull that netted scammers over $385,000 in profit after artificially inflating the asset's market capitalization to approximately $14 million. Details of the Exploit The scheme began when Solana-focused influencer @kimchi1x received 500 million $kimchi tokens and published a promotional post, which was promptly reposted by @a1lon9. Capitalizing on the sudden social media hype, the token's market capitalization surged to a peak of roughly $14 million. Shortly after the price spike, the promotional repost was undone and the original post was deleted, triggering an immediate market collapse of over 95%. On-chain tracing revealed that the operators behind the scheme utilized multiple pre-funded wallets to acquire tokens at negligible entry prices and systematically liquidate them at peak valuation, extracting more than $385,000 in net profits at the expense of retail traders. Block Data Reference Scammer Associated Wallets: 4RZDCgCGyifMvciAy3gjNbbyxNjoYp3nHe6meWUymxL4 98xo3EMWR1Xc4aWUHmn8DD4onMqeDuopRiT2hWeMeiFH 5qVRRiL5HmUXFupQBk2QQ34fhf2boPwhQvZk8yMiwg9M | De.Fi↗ |
28d ago Oct 23, 2026 | Initia Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 23, 2026, Layer-1 network Initia and its rollups were halted following a zero-day vulnerability in its MoveVM implementation on the Cosmos SDK. An attacker minted $7.48M in unbacked face-value tokens (USDC, AUSD, WETH, iUSD) across 13 seconds and drained $2.73M in real coins from cross-chain bridge reserves. Stolen funds were consolidated into 1,135.5 ETH ($2,730,000) on Ethereum, while validators halted the network 42 minutes after minting began. D etails of the Exploit The security incident stemmed from a MoveVM script-caching and state-validation bug connecting Initia's execution engine with the Cosmos SDK. At 14:59:26 UTC, a single account executed transactions that forged $7.48M in unbacked face-value token supplies without modifying the underlying global totals. Over the subsequent 33 minutes, the attacker initiated cross-chain peg-outs across LayerZero adapters and Circle's CCTP via Noble, drawing down real reserve collateral. Noble's USDC backing reserve plummeted 99.99% from $1.09M to $63 by 15:37 UTC, causing normal user withdrawals to bounce. All extracted proceeds were swapped into 1,135.5 ETH (~$2.73M USD) and consolidated into an Ethereum mainnet address. Validators instituted an emergency chain halt 42 minutes post-mint, and exchanges such as Kraken and Upbit suspended INIT deposits and withdrawals. Block Data Reference Destination Address (Ethereum): 0x358ef017a5aa516dcd81bdc80b18cde41cac8 | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 21, 2026 Oct 21, 2026 | Slice Protocol Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 21, 2026, onchain commerce protocol Slice on Base was exploited for approximately $41,000 USD. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability exploited by the attacker resided in the FundsModule contract's handling of external source contracts, where the 0x9d2edfac function accepted release amounts returned by user-specified contracts without verifying asset transfers. To exploit this, the attacker deployed two custom source contracts that reported nonzero asset release amounts while transferring zero assets to the protocol. With the execution flag set to true, the contract utilized these unbacked, fraudulent figures to compute immediate withdrawals from the shared pooled reserves. This logic flaw enabled the attacker to drain approximately $41,000 in pooled ETH and USDC reserves directly to their EOA (0xc34572ebb26b9a4c54854aae8d2347108e8c892f) in a single transaction (0x02b039a6345348d984e4a0b70dd233127772206e61ce82c390c4709c0b8d790a). Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x02b039a6345348d984e4a0b70dd233127772206e61ce82c390c4709c0b8d790a Attacker Address: 0xc34572ebb26b9a4c54854aae8d2347108e8c892f Victim (FundsModule Proxy): 0x61bcd1ed11fc03c958a847a6687b1875f5eacaaf Vulnerable Implementation: 0x8db3b6f51b594dc87b87a3a3b844de9c0d8d60b5 | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 19, 2026 Oct 19, 2026 | Bifi Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 19, 2026, decentralized lending platform BiFi was exploited for approximately $165,600 USD (165.6K USDT) due to an interest rate calculation logic flaw triggered after a 36-day period of market inactivity. The attack was successfully front-run and executed by white-hat/MEV bot c0ffeebabe.eth. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability existed within BiFi's USDT market contract (0x808c...), specifically inside TokenHandler._checkFirstAction. Because the market had been idle for approximately 264,000 blocks (~36 days), _checkFirstAction recorded this block gap as inactiveActionDelta and froze actionEXR once per block. However, subsequent actions within the same block repeatedly re-ran interestModel.getInterestAmount, calculating globalEXR = actionEXR × (1 + rate × 264K). Because rate was calculated dynamically based on live deposit/borrow utilization, an attacker could manipulate market utilization and apply the full 36-day accrued interest rate on every single contract call within that block. The original attacker deployed the exploit contract at block 262,102,55. One block later (block 262,102,56), MEV bot c0ffeebabe.eth front-ran the execution, taking a 40.5M USDT flash loan from Morpho, depositing it in tranches, and borrowing 30M USDT to spike utilization. Through a repeated repay/withdraw loop, the bot extracted the artificially inflated deposit interest, netting 165.6K USDT (swapped to WETH). Block Data Reference Original Attacker Deployment Tx: 0x15b47e2c0daf723dec64c75b435079d3a1f8a6058b21b9a64dda4844e877a034 (Block 262,102,55) Front-Run Execution Tx: 0x756c68055af7a0630aa0b56891ba4de14c56c39cbebe99e47eeb4728f4d6ad14 (Block 262,102,56) Original Attacker Address: 0x7c78a049fff71609990017b58a959e926e6ec4c6 MEV / Front-Runner Address: 0xc0ffeebabe5d496b2dde509f9fa189c25cf29671 (c0ffeebabe.eth) Victim Contract: 0x808c3ba97268dbf9695b1ec10729e09c7e67a9e3 | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 17, 2026 Oct 17, 2026 | Qubic Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary Between October 17 and October 18, 2026, Layer-1 network Qubic experienced a wallet seed generation exploit resulting in approximately 2.94 trillion QU (~$1.3M – $1.4M USD) being drained across 1,404 accounts. The issue stemmed from weak pseudo-random number generation (Math.random()) in the front-end wallet seed creation layer rather than a core blockchain protocol flaw. Details of the Exploit The incident occurred due to insufficient entropy/randomness during wallet seed creation across specific environments, specifically seeds generated using Math.random() on iOS/iPadOS browsers, Safari on macOS (prior to October 18, 2026), and early versions of the Qubic iOS app (prior to July 2025). An attacker brute-forced the predictable seed derivations and systematically drained 1,404 affected wallets between 23:42 UTC on Oct 17 and 01:26 UTC on Oct 18. In response, network operators (Computors) coordinated a protective network halt at tick 85,371,949. As a result of the halt, 87.1% of the drained tokens remained immobilized on-chain, while the remaining 12.9% sent to CEX platform MEXC was frozen by the exchange. The core team deployed version 4.26.4 replacing Math.random() with cryptographically secure randomness (crypto.getRandomValues()). | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 14, 2026 Oct 14, 2026 | Uncx Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 14, 2026, UNCX Network’s Vesting V2 contracts were exploited across four distinct chains for a total of approximately $1.49 million USD due to a share-accounting logic flaw in schedule release and cancellation functions. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability stemmed from inconsistent accounting of _totalTokenShares between the release() and cancel() functions within UNCX Vesting V2 contracts. The attacker initialized multiple vesting schedules, fully released a subset of them, and then transferred tokens directly into the vesting contract as a donation to artificially lower the shares-per-token rate without minting new shares. By subsequently topping up and canceling the released schedules, the attacker manipulated the vesting parameters such that cancel() incorrectly deducted shares that had already been removed by prior releases. This forced an underflow or artificial reduction in the shared _totalTokenShares denominator, which massively inflated the redemption payout of the attacker's final retained schedule. The attacker repeated this loop to drain funds across multiple tokens and chains, resulting in ~$969k on BSC, ~$242k on Ethereum, ~$169k on Robinhood Chain, and ~$114k on Base. | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 13, 2026 Oct 13, 2026 | Gamdom Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary On October 13, 2026, crypto gambling platform Gamdom suffered a multi-chain hot wallet compromise resulting in an estimated $4.208 million stolen ($3.0M+ self-reported) across EVM chains, Solana, Bitcoin, and TRON. The breach stemmed from an unauthorized server connection originally flagged as a hardware disk issue. Details of the Exploit The incident originated when platform monitoring flagged a suspected server disk failure approximately 24 hours prior to the breach. During hardware diagnostics, an unauthorized connection was discovered on an automated backend server responsible for hot wallet withdrawal signing, enabling the attacker to initiate unauthorized transfers. On-chain analysis indicates $2.2 million was drained across EVM networks (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism), $965,000 from Solana, $668,000 from Bitcoin, and $375,000 from TRON. Stolen assets were routed through cross-chain bridges and decentralized exchanges, including THORChain and Hyperliquid. Gamdom halted hot wallet withdrawals, secured remaining funds in cold storage, and initiated platform auditing before resuming services. | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 12, 2026 Oct 12, 2026 | Autheo Network Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 12–13, 2026, Autheo Network’s native THEO token on Base suffered an unbacked cross-chain mint exploit resulting in the unauthorized creation of 19 million THEO tokens. The attacker dumped the minted tokens into liquidity pools on Base for ~298.9 ETH (~$750,000 USD net exploit profit), causing THEO's market price to crash by over 92%. Details of the Exploit The incident stemmed from a vulnerability in the cross-chain message verification system/trusted relayer for Autheo Network. This permitted an "unbacked cross-chain mint" on Base, allowing the attacker to mint 19 million THEO tokens out of thin air from the null address without locking corresponding assets on the source chain. The attacker subsequently dumped 19M THEO across DEX pools (including Hydrex Integral) on Base, extracting ~298.9 ETH (~$750K USD). The attacker then bridged 280.45 ETH to Ethereum Mainnet via Relay bridge. While initial security alerts reported a $1.76M loss based on the destination wallet's total balance of 700.8 ETH, on-chain tracing verified that the address already held ~400.8 ETH prior to the attack, establishing the actual net exploit loss at ~298.9 ETH (~$750,000 USD). Following the attack, Autheo Network issued an urgent security notice instructing users to stop trading and bridging THEO while investigations remain ongoing. | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 10, 2026 Oct 10, 2026 | Papertrade Unknown chainreported | Oracle issue | Quick Summary On October 10, 2026, synthetic perpetuals platform Papertrade suffered a ~$1.28 million USD drain from its shared USDC liquidity pool approximately eight hours after launching on HyperEVM. A trader executed a cross-venue oracle price manipulation scheme, using large spot trades on Hyperliquid to shift the reference BBO mid-price while holding up to 1000x leveraged positions on Papertrade. Details of the Exploit The exploit stemmed from an economic oracle mechanism vulnerability combined with overly permissive launch open-interest (OI) limits. Papertrade operated without an order book or market makers, routing all synthetic long/short trades against a unified USDC liquidity pool with settlement based directly on the Hyperliquid Best Bid and Offer (BBO) midpoint. Taking advantage of high 1000x leverage caps, a trader (0x20256...) opened massive positions on Papertrade (including a ~$297M notional short position with 660x leverage). The trader then bought and sold large quantities of spot ETH (e.g., buying 6,060 ETH to lift prices by ~$3, or 0.12%) on Hyperliquid. Given the 1000x leverage, a minor 0.12% spot price shift amplified position margins by over 120%, enabling the trader to extract $1.28M in net profits from the counterparty liquidity pool at a total spot trading fee cost of ~$52,000. Following the incident, Papertrade lowered its on-chain and relayer OI caps to render future manipulation attempts economically unfeasible (-EV) | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 9, 2026 Oct 9, 2026 | Bitbay Polygonreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 9, 2026, BitBay’s UsdcDaiV4Vault on Polygon was exploited for approximately ~$14,800 USD ( 14,838.47 DAI ) due to an edge-case logic flaw in _withdraw() that transferred the contract's entire DAI balance when vault liquidity equaled zero. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability existed in BitBay's DAI/USDC vault contract (0x048E...) within its internal _withdraw() function. The logic contained a faulty check: when vault liquidity == 0, it transferred the entire token balance held by the vault contract directly to the caller instead of capping the payout to the user's proportional share holding. The attacker executed reposition() to force the vault into a zero-liquidity state, then redeemed just 1 minimal share unit. This triggered the zero-liquidity withdrawal branch and allowed the attacker to extract the entire balance of 14,838.47 DAI. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x5b795dc5c5e1665b712c7ccf478c1d8c59a162d698f4e0bfb40bd303e04a7ff2 Attacker Address: 0x59Ae3c8dd50063429D86BdaEBbC350fB64e9884B Vulnerable Contract: 0x048E88311ca84876aeA086125825492e2AF2e5A0 (UsdcDaiV4Vault) | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 8, 2026 Oct 8, 2026 | X7 Finance Ethereumreported | Abandoned | Quick Summary On October 8, 2026, X7 Finance’s X7Pioneer contract on Ethereum was exploited for approximately 6.78 ETH (~$16,514 USD) due to a reward accounting logic flaw in claimRewards() that repeatedly credited unrecorded ETH balances when called with an empty token array. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability existed in the X7Pioneer contract (0x7000...) within its claimRewards() function, which incremented totalRewards by address(this).balance - lastETHBalance on every invocation but updated lastETHBalance only when claimable > 0. The attacker purchased X7 Pioneer NFT #300 for 0.15 ETH and donated additional ETH directly to the contract to widen the balance delta, then repeatedly invoked claimRewards() passing an empty array to keep claimable at zero. Because lastETHBalance was never updated, each empty-array call repeatedly added the same unrecorded ETH delta to totalRewards, artificially inflating the per-token reward index. The attacker then claimed the inflated rewards to drain 6.78 ETH from the contract, subsequently routing 3.3 ETH into Tornado Cash and transferring the remaining proceeds across secondary wallet addresses. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xc98056d6ab55ef898189da5fa1fb08b968cb84ca99528d171f8240836b21766d Attacker Address: 0xc79352119a7cf6efbfabbd7e6b013b79687bacf2 Vulnerable Contract: 0x70000299ee8910ccacd97b1bb560e34f49c9e4f7 | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 7, 2026 Oct 7, 2026 | 79thvault BNB Chainreported | Access control | Quick Summary On October 7–8, 2026, DeFi staking protocol 79thVault on BNB Smart Chain suffered a privileged account breach resulting in approximately $12.51M to $14.35M stolen. Details of the Exploit The incident stemmed from weak access control management and a compromised operational private key tied to the unverified 79AU token contract. The contract contained a privileged function assigned to a single OPERATOR_ROLE address without multisig or timelock safeguards, which had historically been used to pull 79AU tokens from the PancakeSwap liquidity pool for reward distribution. The attacker utilized this key to execute seven privileged transactions, moving 2.01 million 79AU tokens out of the pool without payment. The attacker then dumped the extracted tokens back into the pool for USDT, draining the pool's dollar reserves and swapping the proceeds into 16,249 BNB. The stolen assets were consolidated into fresh addresses, primarily 0xa953...2F89 holding ~14,385 BNB, while a small test transfer of 30 BNB was deposited into KuCoin. The team revoked the operator privileges, deployed emergency contract patches, and opened on-chain white-hat bounty negotiations with the attacker. | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 4, 2026 Oct 4, 2026 | Adapter Vault Drain Unknown chainreported | Access control | Quick Summary On October 4, 2026, an unnamed Aave v3 adapter vault on Base was drained of 1,783.07 wstETH (~$6.0 million USD). The attacker withdrew the Aave interest-bearing tokens (aBaswstETH), redeemed them for wstETH, and initiated cross-chain bridging to Ethereum. Details of the Exploit The incident occurred via admin key compromise or unauthorized privilege execution rather than a smart contract code bug in Base or Aave core protocol. The attacker seeded gas via Tornado Cash on Ethereum and bridged 0.05 ETH to Base address 0x0B51...B034. The attacker deployed an unverified contract (0xcdfe...569d). Shortly after, the vault's governing 3-of-7 Safe multisig (0x6b27...) executed a transaction calling __setWhitelist__ to approve the attacker's contract. The whitelisted contract executed six consecutive pulls to drain 1,783.07 aBaswstETH from the adapter, redeemed the tokens for underlying wstETH on Aave v3, and transferred 1,001 wstETH into the native Base-to-Ethereum withdrawal queue while leaving 782.07 wstETH sitting on Base in address 0xC734...7f8D. An additional ~11,760 aWETH remaining in the adapter was left untouched. Block Data Reference Target Adapter Contract: 0xd1895f2019c2152fc2b9022d57f19198c4cfcabc Owner Safe Address (3-of-7): 0x6b27512a5943Ed327f6cb6C3EC1f0398229f42C4 Attacker Deployer Address: 0x0B5126e1bc27C0de77e02e97945760A674EdB034 Attacker Whitelisted Contract: 0xcdfe91301356da873562ef513828a60dba1f569d Fund Destination Address: 0xC73448432a05deeA5Ea18a07D3b5d9ccf6297f8D | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 3, 2026 Oct 3, 2026 | Malt Polygonreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 3, 2026, the MALT protocol on Polygon was exploited for ~$72,000 USD due to a smart contract state-ordering flaw that misattributed treasury-funded rebalancing capital as user-supplied swap liquidity. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability was caused by an input attribution and state snapshot flaw within the swap(uint256,uint256,address) function of contract 0xfe6C, which snapshotted pre-swap pool reserves and caller input before executing an external rebalanceHook prior to output transfer. During execution, the hook withdrew DAI from the protocol's Capital Source and deposited it directly into the pool; however, the swap function then validated its invariant against the pool's final balances without separating caller-supplied tokens from protocol-funded rebalancing capital. Exploiting this lack of isolation, the attacker supplied a negligible input to trigger the mid-swap treasury liquidity injection and subsequently withdrew a disproportionately large payout of MALT tokens from pool 0xF0d3. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x915eccb5791508aa89a0a3f1385b26346b127ebb648b046e4cb558474ce8445b Attacker Address: 0x8F103B6A0aD705bcE6357842A5fefEB49e8D83Ef Victim / Pool Address: 0xF0d314849A3Bc9270a79110F25dBA2c8325A2AAC Vulnerable Contract: 0xfe6C096a2871337d4f6F7DD04Ebda733E94D7A13 | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 2, 2026 Oct 2, 2026 | Goldpesa Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 2, 2026, GoldPesa’s GPXHooks contract on Base was exploited for ~$114,900 USD due to a smart contract vulnerability in its liquidity rebalancing accounting, which failed to verify zero currency deltas on a shared, flash-accounted PositionManager during Uniswap v4 hook interactions. Details of the Exploit The attacker opened a PoolManager unlock and minted an unsettled WETH/USDC position to create a -$115k USDC phantom debt on the shared manager. By triggering reBalance() via a swap, the hook burned its real liquidity for a +$148.8k USDC credit, but the attacker's phantom debt absorbed the vast majority of it, leaving the hook with only ~$33.9k. The attacker then burned their own position to clear the debt and withdrew $114.9k USDC directly from PoolManager, before converting the proceeds to 96.4k USDT and bridging off Base via Rango Router. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x5c1febd5047c2a15c37988b6abd5c8b984236dddf6fd24eed96b0f43951ad2c9 Attacker Address: 0x4a5FD2e9357cC87DF4cD6A1808174DBc8646899F Vulnerable Contract: 0x4519e2b040ff1B64fa03aBe2AeF0BC99D7CcEaA8 | De.Fi↗ |
Oct 1, 2026 Oct 1, 2026 | Near Intents Ethereumreported | Other | Quick Summary On October 1, 2026, cross-chain protocol NEAR Intents was exploited for approximately $3,8 million following a hot wallet drain on BNB Smart Chain caused by an integration bug in its Omni bridge infrastructure. On-chain analysis linked the attacker to North Korea's Lazarus Group, while the protocol team patched the flaw and pledged full user reimbursement. Details of the Exploit The attack stemmed from an integration logic flaw between NEAR Intents smart contracts and its Omni deposit/withdrawal layer on BNB Smart Chain, allowing the attacker to execute unauthorized hot wallet withdrawals. The attacker extracted ~$3.865M on BSC, routed a portion toward KuCoin, bridged funds to Ethereum, and executed seven Chainflip swaps to acquire ~33.7 BTC (~$2.9M), which remains parked across four unspent Bitcoin addresses. On-chain tracking confirmed the attacker interacted with known Lazarus Group infrastructure (0x098B7...E2f96). In response, NEAR Intents patched the contract-side flaw, temporarily suspended Omni bridge operations across 11 chains, and guaranteed 100% user compensation from protocol reserves. Block Data Reference BSC Attack Hashes: 0x9fe58e031f73bbd880c782bc9e7446bcda32cadb304a729209871a4a81856c4c 0x0381265d6a1bb09de899f49f410a8b907cd548358a7e3c91076c3a52656b8220 0x69d1c68c7e961a0199d3c9f3b6a31cb168ed775ef34b51a42762253ac1efcceb 0x9c10b967da0c85631ec105e3b322c0a851fcd01b69ff390ff58f860e5cce003a | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 30, 2026 Sep 30, 2026 | MCN Labs BNB Chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On September 30, 2026, the MCN Labs LPBonus contract on BNB Smart Chain was exploited for ~$92,600 USD (1,442,165.71 FIST) due to a reward accounting logic flaw that used inconsistent MSN reserve values during reward accrual versus withdrawal calculations. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability was located in MCN Labs' LPBonus contract (0x5227...), which used inconsistent MSN reserve values to track reward distributions. The AddFistFee function updated the global reward index (oneshareFIST) by dividing newly acquired FIST rewards by the MSN reserve present at accrual time. However, CalcPendingUser later multiplied this index by a user weight calculated from the MSN reserve present at claim time. The attacker manipulated the reserve down to ~89.33 MSN during reward accrual, then inflated it to ~491.11 MSN before executing UserRemoveLp. This calculation mismatch enabled a newly registered LP to claim 1,442,165.71 FIST despite the intervening reward pool receiving only 940,041.61 FIST in legitimate funding. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xecac1563bbb76fb8fefb4a7da4592260a8c1ddde21d7da62b78a9e3769808e6b Attacker Address: 0xb6fff29dd2b5423a159e50877fc4af7a54e76f7a Vulnerable Contract: 0x52272524a22f941f5489c1233732797314bb054b | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 29, 2026 Sep 29, 2026 | Fastswap BNB Chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On September 29, 2026, the FastSwap protocol on BNB Smart Chain was exploited in an on-chain attack detected by TenArmor, resulting in an estimated loss of approximately $92,600 USD. Details of the Exploit An attacker executed a malicious transaction targeting the FIST token and FastSwap smart contracts (0xc9882def23bc42d53895b8361d0b1edc7570bc6a) on BNB Smart Chain. The exploit allowed the attacker to manipulate protocol contracts and drain liquidity pools, extracting ~$92.6K in value within a single transaction. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xecac1563bbb76fb8fefb4a7da4592260a8c1ddde21d7da62b78a9e3769808e6b Target Token / Contract: 0xc9882def23bc42d53895b8361d0b1edc7570bc6a | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 26, 2026 Sep 26, 2026 | Dyorswap Ethereumconfirmed | Phishing | Quick Summary On September 26–27, 2026, scammers deployed a fake OP Stack Layer 2 network impersonating the unreleased GIWA Mainnet (Chain ID 9134) and set up a fraudulent bridge. 1,335 user addresses deposited 767.65 ETH into the fake bridge to trade on DYORSWAP, allowing the scammers to extract 766.25 ETH (~$2.0 million USD) on Ethereum. Details of the Exploit The incident was a fake infrastructure scam rather than a smart contract flaw in DYORSWAP's protocols. Scammers configured a malicious network using GIWA's official Chain ID (9134) alongside a fake bridge and OP Stack batcher. When traders connected to the fake RPC and deposited ETH to trade on DYORSWAP, the malicious bridge contract captured the L1 funds. The scammers drained 766.25 ETH at Ethereum block 26,067,309. DYORSWAP confirmed its core contracts were safe, published a claims collection form, and distributed over 200 ETH from its treasury to compensate affected users while tracing the scammers' funding sources. | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 24, 2026 Sep 24, 2026 | Payy Network Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary On September 24, 2026, privacy-focused stablecoin payment protocol Payy Network suffered a security breach on its rollup contract, resulting in the drain of ~$1.83 million in USDC. The stolen funds were swapped for 683.38 ETH and dispersed across three external addresses. Details of the Exploit The exploit targeted Payy Network's RollupV1 contract via a forged verifyRollup batch transaction that reportedly compromised or misused protocol prover and validator keys. Two days prior to the attack, the attacker seeded gas into the attack wallet using the Railgun privacy protocol. During the exploit, the attacker extracted ~1.83 million USDC, converted it into ~683 ETH, and distributed the proceeds across four fresh destination addresses (~200 ETH, ~280 ETH, ~200 ETH, and 1 ETH) where they currently sit unmoved. An additional ~90.2k USDC remains held in the attacker's entry wallet and has not been blacklisted by Circle. In response, Payy Network halted all rollup bridge transactions, deposits, and withdrawals while initiating investigation and recovery efforts. | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 24, 2026 Sep 24, 2026 | Duelbits Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary On September 24, 2026, crypto casino and sportsbook platform Duelbits suffered a multi-chain hot wallet compromise resulting in estimated total losses of $4.9M to $7.0M across Ethereum, BNB Chain, Tron, Bitcoin, and Solana. The platform took its services offline to investigate and refill operational hot wallets while user cold storage remained unaffected. Details of the Exploit The attack was executed via a private key compromise targeting Duelbits' operational hot wallets across five blockchains. On EVM chains, the attacker extracted 836 ETH, 1.146M USDT, 209 BNB, 96.8K USDC, 31.5K DAI, and 12.4B SHIB, alongside 8.1 BTC on Bitcoin and 192K TRX on Tron. The attacker routed the stolen multi-chain assets through swap protocols and cross-chain bridges, converting the proceeds into Ether and consolidating approximately 2,234.6 ETH (~$6.0M) into a single destination Ethereum address. Duelbits confirmed the hot wallet breach and suspended operations pending system remediation and hot wallet refilling. Block Data Reference Attacker EVM Address 1: 0xA77e24Fe29d16E051e487ef4Ea7b056cb05aef76 Attacker EVM Address 2: 0x6761c9b15815f4051773EDe39B42B95bdDB3EF1c Attacker Bitcoin Address: bc1qhtu84kz3y94lvgl2t05zk84tqh57grvd82zvcl Attacker Tron Address: TAvraZZFCZbDSZoyqWWRRsBkFgZqKaCGbK Attacker Solana Address: A3EBrhMBEGzcPgmbwywSPhW39G6PFGrorU8ib99T6yKw | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 24, 2026 Sep 24, 2026 | Bitget Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary On September 24, 2026, centralized exchange Bitget suffered a major infrastructure breach resulting in ~$351.6 million stolen from its hot and warm wallet layers. Bitget paused withdrawals while confirming its cold wallets remained secure and stating that its $464M+ User Protection Fund will fully reimburse user losses. Details of the Exploit The attacker penetrated Bitget's core wallet backend infrastructure and spoofed internal transaction data to trigger authorized withdrawals across multiple blockchains without compromising private keys. Stolen assets included ETH, XRP, USDT, USDC, AVAX, and BNB. On EVM chains, the attacker converted most of the stolen proceeds into 67,982 ETH (~$183 million). On-chain analysis and VPN traffic patterns linked the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group (specifically the TraderTraitor subgroup) through bridged funds connected to the earlier AFX Trade exploit. Bitget contained the breach, stopped further unauthorized transfers, and is preparing system recovery before resuming withdrawals. | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 23, 2026 Sep 23, 2026 | Meter Protocol BNB Chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On September 23–24, 2026, Meter.io suffered a dual consensus and bridge exploit after an attacker leveraged a block validation flaw on Meter mainnet and exploited the Meter Passport bridge on BNB Chain, resulting in ~$2.3 million in unbacked wMTRG minted and partially dumped on PancakeSwap. Details of the Exploit On September 23 at 21:14 UTC, an attacker exploited a block validation flaw on the Meter mainnet consensus layer to mint unbacked MTR and MTRG tokens. The attacker then used the Meter Passport bridge on BNB Chain across two main transactions to mint approximately $2.3 million in unbacked wrapped MTRG (wMTRG), dumping a portion into PancakeSwap liquidity pools and bridging funds out. Meter paused both mainnet and bridge operations, invalidated transactions post-block 100731417, and issued a 72-hour whitehat bounty offer of 10% for the return of funds. Block Data Reference Attacker Addresses: 0xee2eeeed4ed8580669ed924abeb49f27f7d0bd65 0x44cf94496091150865e192a86c07b90a9760b43d 0x7db6ac6Fa3c8aa2c6FB9BdCD4800e8BAacDd2EE8 Abused Token Contract (BSC): 0xBd2949F67DcdC549c6Ebe98696449Fa79D988A9F Sample Exploit Transaction (BSC): 0x2745dd5121eb03d1979cf229f432a422137942ede186d9fa0129a2f83401eeef Bounty Return Address: 0xB980Ff36A99C0C3B408279E025d8E2DA7eF65105 | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 22, 2026 Sep 22, 2026 | Astroport Unknown chainreported | Access control | Quick Summary On September 22, 2026, Cosmos ecosystem DEX Astroport suffered a security breach on the Neutron chain that exposed protocol admin controls. Validators halted Neutron and Cosmos Hub to coordinate an emergency response, intercepting approximately 1.396 million ATOM (~$2.53 million USD) before the attacker could cash out. Details of the Exploit The attacker compromised admin privileges for Astroport contracts on Neutron, placing liquidity across connected pools at risk. The attacker converted stolen funds into ATOM and initiated a streaming swap of 200,000 ATOM to ETH via THORChain. Only 15.5% of the swap filled (19.92 ETH) before Cosmos Hub halted at block 33,086,740. Cosmos Hub validators deployed a binary upgrade that transferred 1,227,121 ATOM from the attacker's account to a recovery multisig and added an ante-handler to block the attacker's key from signing future transactions. An additional 168,990 ATOM refund remains queued on THORChain, requiring a secondary sweep once GAIA chain processing unhalts. Astroport contracts on Terra were unaffected after their admin connection to Neutron was severed. Block Data Reference Attacker Cosmos Address: cosmos1dd25c4sshelrpfs0433apg24c5phrhk8m96c4n | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 21, 2026 Sep 21, 2026 | Internet Token INT Unknown chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On September 21, 2026, the Internet Token protocol on Base was exploited for 5.85 WETH and 764 million INT after an attacker leveraged an unvalidated Uniswap V3 pool callback parameter to arbitrarily mint ~925 million INT tokens. Details of the Exploit The vulnerability was present in INT's LiquidityUnifier contract (0x837d...), which held MINTER_ROLE rights and exposed an unvalidated swapV3(token, pool) function. The function only validated that the passed pool parameter contained bytecode and that its token0() and token1() getters returned the INT token address. The attacker deployed a malicious contract returning INT for both token endpoints, causing swapV3 to invoke pool.swap(). This callback re-entered uniswapV3SwapCallback and minted an arbitrary amount of INT tokens directly to the fake pool. The attacker routed the minted tokens through a Convertor contract round-trip to bypass validateSupply sanity checks, created ~925 million INT, dumped a portion into the official INT/WETH V3 pool for 5.85 WETH, and kept the remaining ~764 million INT. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0xed62bb27bd1058d3d7cc93d55421d6d0001ced8cb4529b02773f5126a4edb08b Attacker Address: 0x5f7ce6395818857ac20730dc990f614356d1ec68 Victim Contract: 0x837dbabc4f5fa78baf177597edbda09645822032 | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 21, 2026 Sep 21, 2026 | RWC Token BNB Chainreported | Other | Quick Summary On September 21, 2026, the RWC token protocol on BNB Smart Chain was hit by an on-chain attack detected by TenArmor, resulting in an estimated loss of approximately $109,000 USD. Details of the Exploit An attacker executed a malicious transaction targeting the RWC contract on BNB Smart Chain, exploiting a smart contract vulnerability to drain funds from the project's liquidity or protocol pools. Security monitoring systems flagged the atomic execution trace after ~$109,000 in value was extracted. Block Data Reference Attack Transaction Hash: 0x9c919da34696425913f32587f00d2838031a8726a2c5ddfa39e33a45b36e6427 | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 19, 2026 Sep 19, 2026 | ASI Alliance Singularitynet Ethereumreported | Access control | Quick Summary On September 19–20, 2026, an attacker used compromised SingularityNET bridge and NuNet deployer private keys to drain $FET and mint unauthorized supplies of $AGIX,$NTX, $WMTx, and $CGV on Ethereum. The attacker extracted ~$1.44M to $1.67M in liquid ETH before project teams paused bridges and revoked minting authorities. Details of the Exploit The exploit resulted from compromised private signing keys rather than smart contract logic bugs. On September 19, the attacker called conversionIn on Fetch.ai's TokenConversionManagerV3 using a stolen SingularityNET authorizer signature to drain 8.72M $FET (~$1.53M) and swap it for ETH. Minutes later, a compromised NuNet deployer account minted 408.53M $NTX to reach its 1 billion supply cap. On September 20, the attacker used the SingularityNET bridge authority to mint 260M $AGIX, 53.84M $WMTx, and ~500M$CGV. High slippage on low liquidity pools limited total extracted value to 546–649 ETH (~$1.44M–$1.67M), while token market prices collapsed by 65% to 99%. Affected protocols responded by pausing bridges, revoking signing authorities, and contacting exchanges to freeze funds. Block Data Reference Attacker Address: 0x2dcc1085fDCf418B421E45e86e4e54637cc21dfE NuNet Deployer Address: 0x863F13e5B505f1Eb17803b94EC9d3DaF80092165 Fetch.ai Conversion Contract: 0xab424A430CC09864fA1277A38193111705ADF3A3 | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 17, 2026 Sep 17, 2026 | Nostra Finance Unknown chainreported | Oracle issue | Quick Summary On September 17, 2026, Starknet money market Nostra Finance suffered an oracle price manipulation exploit resulting in ~$3.53 million in unauthorized borrows across ETH, STRK, USDC, USDT, WBTC, and DAIv1 against inflated NSTR collateral, forcing the protocol to pause all lending, borrowing, and liquidation operations. Details of the Exploit The attacker exploited Nostra Finance's collateral valuation oracle for NSTR by manipulating its underlying price pool on Ekubo DEX. The attacker withdrew existing liquidity around NSTR's real market price, seeded a decoy liquidity band at $99 per NSTR, and routed a $14.72 dust swap (190 NSTR) through the gap to artificially inflate the oracle price by 16,645x. Using just 294,177 NSTR collateral, normally worth ~$1,756, the attacker leveraged the inflated valuation to draw $3,531,922.97 in mixed assets across six borrowing legs. The attacker then bridged ~$1.93 million (234.57 ETH and 1.3M DAI) to Ethereum while leaving ~$1.55 million in assets on Starknet. Block Data Reference Starknet Attacker Contract: 0x06d48ef7ab62c26e3ef1987c322096cd508e9034c82048783a6b438fc1344bc3 Ethereum Destination Address: 0xa059aaab82773caf622de9d9a0f2dbf9aa7f3c37 | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 16, 2026 Sep 16, 2026 | Flamincome Ethereumreported | Flash loan attack | Quick Summary On September 16, 2026, legacy Ethereum yield-aggregator Flamincome (associated with Flamingo Finance) suffered an oracle and vault share price manipulation exploit, resulting in a net attacker profit of $345,902.67 USDT via an $18.09 million Morpho flash loan. Details of the Exploit The attacker targeted legacy 2020-era VaultYUSDT strategy contracts that calculated asset holdings and share values using Curve's manipulable virtual price. Using an $18.09 million USDT flash loan borrowed from Morpho, the attacker staked Curve USDP LP tokens into the strategy contract to artificially inflate the vault's share pricing and Net Asset Value (NAV). With the share valuation artificially elevated, the attacker redeemed their oversized shares for liquid aUSDT from Aave at a favorable exchange rate, repaid the $18.09 million flash loan in the same atomic transaction, and extracted $345,902.67 USDT in profit. Block Data Reference On-Chain Key Addresses: Attacker Primary Address: 0x83381e7f7232775735169d72d237b858ffc36871 Target Strategy / Vault: 0xb8d6471ca573c92c7096ab8600347f6a9fe268a5 Exploit Contract 1: 0x875da4bd7b4a52a806a533b1cf6d6ff92365d2e6 Exploit Contract 2: 0x1c7eacef3630e764519e6ea2e8caa2bdb7d8b486 | De.Fi↗ |
Sep 16, 2026 Sep 16, 2026 | Meme Coin Phishing Scam Unknown chainconfirmed | Phishing | Quick Summary On September 16, 2026, a social engineering campaign disguised as a Cloudflare human verification check targeted meme coin traders on DEX aggregators like DexScreener and Axiom. Bypassing Web3 wallet signatures entirely, the attack tricking victims into running local OS-level scripts resulted in total reported losses exceeding $600,000. Details of the Exploit Attackers embedded malicious URLs within public token metadata fields on DEX aggregators. Visiting these links redirected users to a fake Cloudflare page that silently copied a malicious PowerShell command to the system clipboard while prompting the sequence Win + R + Ctrl + V + Enter. Running the payload via native Windows tools bypassed browser security, installing an infostealer that granted attackers full host access to extract private keys, browser session credentials, and drain irectly ~$600,000 from top trader. | De.Fi↗ |
Liquidations updated 10h ago · Incidents updated 2d ago